



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER (CVN 69)
FPO NEW YORK 09532

3 July 1981

*originally
Aug 1975*

COMMANDING OFFICER'S MEMORANDUM #1

Subj: Command Goals

In a command as complex and diverse as IKE it is imperative that the Commanding Officer identify and define his primary goals in order to provide direction for our combined activities. The goals must be clearly stated as they will be the foundation for the performance of the myriad functions of the command and they must serve as the common denominator for ALL HANDS.

To be credible, whatever primary goals are established must be attainable. They should reflect the purpose for which we exist - and the results we want to achieve. They must serve as the media by which our multiple interests are channeled into cohesive effort. The realization of these goals is the target toward which all our decisions and actions must be oriented.

The first goal is easy - TO BE THE MOST MISSION-CAPABLE CARRIER IN THE SERVICE OF OUR COUNTRY. It is easy because as I take command, IKE is the most mission-capable carrier. And that is obviously a direct result of the efforts of those currently embarked and their immediate predecessors. The task therefore is to maintain this position of preeminence and even to improve on it wherever able. We simply must be capable of executing all missions assigned to the highest degree of proficiency attainable. The second goal is TO PROVIDE AN ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH ALL PERSONS IN IKE CAN PERFORM THEIR DUTIES UNENCUMBERED BY FACTORS DETRIMENTAL TO PERFORMANCE. This goal is totally dependent on the leadership provided. It touches every man aboard every day, and that's just the point. I will take the lead and I will be looking for the leadership in IKE to be ensuring this environment. I will also expect every man aboard to come to understand his responsibilities to it and how he affects others by his attitude and his daily performance of duty.

I would be remiss to just state two broad concepts and then expect exact interpretation by all concerned, so I will try to expand on how I feel these goals can be met; that is by strict and persistent attention to SAFETY, SANITATION, SECURITY, and SERVICE.

SAFETY: SAFETY is not mushy and gray. We either do things safely or we don't. It is either in our minds as we carry out our responsibilities or it isn't. A ship does not win the Flatley Award two years in a row by chance or coincidence; that ship does its mission with SAFETY in the minds of the leaders making decisions and in the minds of the men taking the action. Everybody thinking about SAFETY everyday in everything they do is insurance against loss of life or limb and it provides for the protection of extremely expensive equipment.

Two of the key factors in promoting SAFETY are our PQS (job and watch training) and PMS (equipment maintenance and reliability) programs. Assigning personnel who are not PQS qualified or allowing them to stand watch on or operate equipment is inviting disaster. This is why we have certain minimum standards in IKE for PQS and PMS qualifications.

Another major contributor to SAFETY is proper supervision of inexperienced personnel. They don't learn it all in the books; they must learn the operational idiosyncrasies through experience, and while they are gaining that experience by hands-on operation, it is essential that they are supervised by competent qualified personnel.

There are many more programs in IKE that contribute heavily to personal SAFETY such as the Heat Stress Program, the Hearing Conservation Program, the Electrical Safety Program, etc. They protect the health and welfare of all participants if enforced, and lead unwittingly to damaging health risks if not enforced.

Accidents can be prevented - they are not necessarily inevitable - and the ship that thinks SAFETY prevents them. That ship also saves human life and injury and untold costs in damage to equipment.

SANITATION: Nothing contributes more to establishing environment than cleanliness and SANITATION. First and foremost, SANITATION is the protection of crew health through professional Medical and Dental attention. SANITATION is also rigid adherence to high standards in places where meals are prepared, served, and eaten.

SANITATION is most certainly the maintenance of high standards of cleanliness in berthing compartments and heads. It is cleaning or changing mildewed shower mats and curtains. It is chain-of-command attention to sweepers so dust and trash and grime are not allowed to accumulate. It is weekly zone inspections by command teams or department teams. It is every man depositing litter in trash receptacles, but for those that don't, it is also every man (from Captain to Seaman) bending over to help keep the ship clean.

It is frequent laundry service to keep odors in berthing to a minimum. It is open curtains in berthing areas (when not occupied) to keep the ventilation flowing as designed. It is upgrading habitability by authorized means, division by division. SANITATION is many things, but above all, it is making IKE a safe and environmentally clean place to live and work.

SECURITY: SECURITY is attained when men don't fear that they will be hurt or robbed by others. It is a respected MAA Force. It is freedom for a man to speak out against coercion or immoral behavior or racism or abusive language or drug abuse where he lives or works.

SECURITY is knowing that you are safely protected by those on watch who are competent and qualified (PQS) to keep the ship out of danger (SAFETY) or to combat an emergency should one arise. It is trust in shipmates and in the chain-of-command that there is help available when needed. It is the protection of human rights and privacy. It is respect for the dignity of every individual.


Aside from protection of the individual, SECURITY is also the safeguarding of classified material. It is the protection of the physical plant to include reactors, nuclear weapons, aircraft, and all other machinery and equipment on which our mission depends. They have all been paid for by the American taxpayer (including ourselves) and entrusted to our care for safekeeping. The total investment in IKE with the Wing aboard equates to more than a million \$ per man, and we are responsible to our nation to protect that investment.

SERVICE: SERVICE comes in various forms. It is providing for the basic needs of all men aboard. It is shipmates providing services to other shipmates in a professional but pleasant manner. Every man aboard is in the business of providing some service to his shipmates, whether they are personal services or direct mission related services. Since each serves each other, it stands to reason that none are more important than others and none can be done without. All functions conducted aboard IKE are essential to the overall mission accomplishment.

SERVICE is especially critical through the chain-of-command; this is leadership. Lack of the SERVICE of leadership results in ineptness and stagnation of entire segments of the command. Strong naval leadership is essential. SERVICE is also response to orders from above in the chain-of-command. This service is more commonly understood, but it only results when there is strong leadership down through the chain-of-command.

SERVICE is most importantly service to country. As military men, each and every one of us has taken an oath to "support and defend the Constitution of the United States, and to protect her from all enemies, foreign and domestic..." We have given up few of our rights as citizens to fulfill this oath. We are able and we have the equipment, IKE and CVW-7, to carry out our responsibilities. As able as we are to conduct war, our greatest contribution to world peace is our ability to do our job better than anybody else, and therefore deter war in the first place. The best offense is a good defense, and in peace time, that is our primary mission - to deter any enemy from harming us or our nation or our allies. There is no more capable ship in the world to do that than IKE.

The goals of mission capability and environment are both ultimate and pervasive. Ultimate in that they focus on the achievement of specific objectives; pervasive in that they should be the unique and underlying concept on which all actions in IKE are based. In closing I need only echo the ship's motto: MISSION CAPABILITY is our aim; QUALITY, SPIRIT and CHARACTER...our game.



E. W. CLEXTON JR.

Distribution:

ALL OFFICERS

ALL CHIEF PETTY OFFICERS



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER (CVN 69)
FPO NEW YORK 09532

3 July 1981

COMMANDING OFFICER MEMORANDUM #2

Subj: Thoughts on Naval Leadership

THERE ARE TWO MAJOR JOBS FOR AN OFFICER (CPO)

One is the billet he fills. He is expected to learn as much as he can about that billet and gain as much technical knowledge about the equipment, the systems, and the interrelations with other systems, and the operation and maintenance of the equipment and systems.

But this technical knowledge will be for naught if he only channels in on his technical billet, for the ultimate performance of his division will not ever approach optimum if he does not provide the straight-forward, honest naval leadership that is so critical to the overall functioning of his division.

What are the elements of leadership in simplest terms:

Know Yourself.

Know Your Job.

Know Your Men.

As a naval leader you cannot be faltering or lack confidence in your own abilities. You have to know your own limitations so you can always be striving to expand your own capabilities, your own competence, and your own character.

We have libraries full of manuals and drawings and charts and all other sorts of technical data to help you get to know your equipment and how to operate it and how to fix it. We have schools throughout the Navy to train people in the principles of operation of equipment and how to operate or maintain it, and you can spend the rest of your Navy career reading and learning and keeping paperwork flowing from your IN basket to your OUT basket.

I guarantee that your IN basket will be just as full in ten years as it is today. Too many "navy leaders" find themselves slaves to a desk and to the ever present pressures to do better and faster on all of the endless technical work that they are expected to accomplish.

That man has lost the battle! Leadership takes dedicated time; time away from the desk; time "in the field"; time with and for his men.

Even the worst leader in the Navy will at least know who his men are if he's on a small ship with a small division. He may even know the things that bother them because he at least rubs elbows with them daily in the working environment.

Not so on an aircraft carrier. Some divisions exceed 100 men and even the most natural leader in the Navy has got to take time to get to know who they are before he can even start to be their leader.

You have got to structure your priorities for the total job even if it means setting aside the less critical technical matters during the working day to get away from the office and out into the working spaces. If it means you handle more mundane paperwork after hours, so be it.

Your performance as an officer (CPO) is evaluated as the whole. The most technically competent officer who lacks practical leadership experience is not the best candidate for command.

The division that is adequately trained but not led will not perform to expectations and will display indicators of frustration. They don't have a safety valve when things build up. There is no response from their division leaders to their problems because the division leaders don't know what their problems are. It matters not how big or little the problem is — the frustration level will be the same --- High. In the long run the paperwork dilemma builds up because the men are trying to get away from that environment or they are getting in trouble (UA, drugs, alcohol, family problems, etc). They certainly don't project themselves into a leadership role in the future Navy to be like their immediate leaders. The only reason they might reenlist is to get to another duty station where they assume things will be better. Getting more men certainly does not help the problem. Even the technical pressures increase because the division is not producing anywhere near expectations. So you see, the "leader" has not met the technical challenge or the leadership challenge.

Knowing Your Men

You will always know who your top 10% are because they are the ones who always get the challenging jobs done. They're generally sharper, quicker, and more comfortable around you because they exude confidence in themselves. You're more comfortable with them because they help you learn your job better and they help you feel successful.

You'll also know the bottom 10% because they seem to get into the discipline chain that takes too much of your time. When your Chief spills his problems to you their names keep cropping up.

The challenge of leadership is knowing the other 80% — the main work force upon which you and your division "sink or swim" — the men that do their duty to you and IKE and their country without flair. They are not an administrative burden. They don't ask for much. They are honest with you and expect you to be the same. They know the answer is not always YES but they also know you are fair in dealing with all your men, be they the top 10% or the bottom 50%. They have wives and children that they love and provide for just as you do. They may be shy. They may not be very talkative with you because of previous contact with leaders who didn't really care, or at least it seemed that way. They are your men. The leadership you provide them is critical to the performance of your division and to the combat readiness of IKE. They are totally worthy of your time and efforts to know them, to respond to their needs, to counsel them on the full gamut of personal and Navy topics, and especially to recognize their daily efforts and how they contribute to the effectiveness of their unit and to their country. Be their leader and they will be your men.

The men that know their leaders are responsive and get the recognition they deserve for their everyday duties will generate personal job satisfaction within themselves and will never fail you when the going gets rough.

Leadership is not tough -- it just takes time. In the words of one of the greatest leaders in the history of the United States,

"You do not lead by hitting people over the head. Any damn fool can do that, but it's usually called 'assault' -- not 'leadership' ... I'll tell you what leadership is:

It's persuasion - and
conciliation - and
education - and
patience. It's long, slow, tough work. That's the only kind of leadership I know - or believe in - or will practice."

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
Spring 1953
Oval Office

If the leader is basically shy or uncomfortable in his role (which is natural for the inexperienced), he has got to conjure up the gumption within himself and thrust himself into the role. Experience is a valuable teacher in the field of leadership. A self made leader is a confident leader and one his men will respect because his abilities have been generated from within - he's done it "his way."


E. W. CLEXTON, JR.

Distribution:
All Officers
All Chief Petty Officers



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
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FPO NEW YORK 09532

15 July 1981

COMMANDING OFFICER'S MEMORANDUM #3

Subj: Some thoughts on the Chain of Command

Every supervisor and leader in IKE is a link in the chain of command. There can be no other means of management of such a military organization than by use of the chain of command in every facet of our mission.

How the chain of command works down is quite obvious to the most casual observer. If the Captain tells the XO to have hammocks installed on the forecastle for some visiting VIP's, the XO directs the Supply Officer to cough up some canvas and line and the Engineer to mount some hooks in appropriate places and the First Lieutenant to assemble and hang the hammocks on the forecastle. The department heads would have directed their respective divisions, certain work centers would have been busy through the night, and the next day there would be a dozen seamen making ready for VIP's on the forecastle. The chain of command would have worked from the Captain to some deck seamen in less than a day.

Does it take less than a day for a request chit to proceed up the chain of command? Working down the chain of command doesn't normally take much research enroute, while working a request chit up generally requires some study and interviewing, so the answer is appropriately — not usually ... BUT, speed is not the key, RESPONSIVENESS is!!!

It is incumbent on every Officer, Chief Petty Officer, and Petty Officer in IKE to be responsive to their men. Responsiveness is defined physiologically as the act of responding to some stimulus. A man who doesn't see the chain of command responsive to him becomes frustrated, loses interest, doesn't trust his leaders, and in the end will not perform anywhere near expectations. He does not have a relief valve; he's bottled up; he certainly won't respond to direction from above (except under duress) unless he feels they can and will respond to him. Every man doesn't test the system, but every man has shipmates around him who have tested the system. Straightforward, honest naval leadership is the key.

Did I say speed is not important? NO. I said responsive review was more important than speed, but the time involved in review can sometimes be as damaging to an individual's morale as a review lacking consideration. Responsiveness is also defined as reacting readily to appeals, efforts, etc. I make it a habit to sift through my paperwork at least twice a day just looking for special request chits in question. There are other methods that are worth your consideration and the one that works for you is worth developing. It will pay dividends in the administration of your division and in the responsiveness your division displays to you.

I in no way intend to convey that responsiveness means the answer is always YES. The answer is certainly not always YES, but there have been too many times in naval history that the answer was NO when YES was equally appropriate. To answer NO because "that's the way it was when I enlisted" just doesn't sell with me.

The answer is quite frequently NO and for good reason. The man that knows his request has been reviewed by the appropriate seniors in his chain of command and those seniors have reacted favorably or unfavorably based on their honest appraisal and best judgement, has seen the chain of command working up. There are many men who never solicit the chain of command, but they sure know if it is responsive or not by the atmosphere that exists in their division or the experiences of their shipmates.

Insist on the proper usage of the chain of command within your division/department and be the best example yourself.


E. W. CLEXTON, JR.

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ALL CHIEF PETTY OFFICERS



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
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30 July 1981

COMMANDING OFFICER'S MEMORANDUM #4

Subj: Some thoughts on the relationship between recognition and job satisfaction

The productivity of your organization will depend on many things; the overall manning in quality and quantity, the training your men have attained, the leadership you and your immediate subordinates provide, the stability the command provides, the working environment, and the feelings that exist in the hearts of your men. We've discussed many of these items in past memos. Now let's touch on the last one. When we talk about feelings about a job, we're talking about job satisfaction.

It is my contention that job satisfaction is made up of two basic ingredients. Your men have the capability to provide one, but as their leader, you have to provide the other. Job satisfaction requires accomplishment of a job and recognition of that accomplishment by the boss.

Recognition is such a valuable tool of leadership. The end result of leadership is men working toward a common goal, yet attainment of that goal may be impossible without those men gaining satisfaction for attainment of intermediate goals along the way. Without job satisfaction your men will easily lose interest and productivity will slowly deteriorate. You'll never know where you've lost a man, but if he doesn't derive job satisfaction from what he does, he'll certainly be lost. He may put in his hours and months and years but his productivity will be way shy of expectations. This spiral can be reversed however, by helping the man derive job satisfaction for what he does by recognizing his efforts for his division, for IKE, and for his country.

The simplest forms of recognition are by far the most effective. A man doesn't gain job satisfaction from an evaluation in his service record. He feels satisfaction from a job he does and from the fact that his efforts are recognized by his boss. I'm talking about everyday work ... usually mundane ... not usually very glamorous. Who knows (or should know) what he's done today? Except in unusual circumstances the Captain doesn't know, the XO doesn't know, his Department Head probably doesn't even know ... his Chief knows, and his Division Officer should know.

What does it take to say "Thanks?" ... not much. What does it take to say "Well Done?" ... not much. What does it take to just smile? ... not much. Remember there are two essential ingredients for job satisfaction; job accomplishment is a prerequisite, but the fulfillment comes when the job is recognized. Very few men gain job satisfaction from just doing the job. Recognizing a man for a job he didn't do or didn't do well doesn't work either, because it takes both ingredients. So a Division Officer (CPO) who has not developed the habit of recognizing his men for their accomplishments withholds one ingredient and his men (with few exceptions) will not derive the job satisfaction on which continued good service is so dependent.

I say again ... It is recognition in its simplest form (everyday gratitude for everyday work) that is by far the most effective.


E. W. CLEXTON, JR.



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15 August 1981

COMMANDING OFFICER'S MEMORANDUM #5

Subj: Some Thoughts On Command Environment and Atmosphere

The dictionary says Environment means the aggregate (sum) of surrounding things, conditions, or influences. Among other things, Atmosphere means a pervading (spread throughout) influence or a distinctive quality. The words can be used interchangeably except that environment more properly refers to the physical surroundings while atmosphere is an intangible feeling when speaking of command environment or command atmosphere. If two ship are built alike and they both fall under the same Fleet and Force Commands why wouldn't their environment and atmosphere be essentially the same? Because commands are made up of people, not metal and wiring. The physical environment may be the same, but the command environment can be totally different. The top leadership are people and the newest boot seamen/airmen/firemen are people. The interchange between all these people minute after minute, hour after hour, and day after day is what makes commands different.

We have strived for over 5 years to create an environment in IKE that is conducive to high productivity in all areas; to create a positive atmosphere that promotes courtesy among shipmates; to maintain physical surroundings that are pleasing to the eye and therefor enjoyable to work, berth, and eat in; to establish policies that are not based on misjudgements or biases so they are simple to understand and follow; to establish programs within the ship's organization that are tailored to the people embarked and that reinforce the command atmosphere in their everyday work.

What does it cost to establish such an atmosphere and to maintain such an environment? It costs plenty. It costs people from throughout the command to be in billets that are essential to such an environment, yet not necessarily acknowledged by the Naval Military Personnel Command as a firm operational requirement. It costs many manhours each day spent in cleaning and maintenance. It costs a few seconds each day for everyone concerned (officers as well as enlisted) to stoop over and pick up a coke can top or a candy wrapper that's been discarded in the wrong place. It costs a little more frequent expenditure of division funds to replace spoiled shower mats and curtains and other habitability related items. It costs the loss of some of the better people from work centers all over the ship to perform temporary duties in the Enlisted Dining Facility or on the Master at Arms Force. It takes work center supervisors all over the ship meeting each other and working together to solve their mutual problems, even those that are in conflict with each other. It takes petty officers who take their responsibilities seriously and prevent violations of ship's regulations or who do something about such violations if known to them. It takes mutual respect of shipmates who have a job to do. Is it worth it?

Even as big as IKE is, we have 100,000 encounters each day where two or more shipmates are competing for space or time. As the old saying goes, courtesy is contagious, and if many of these encounters are less than pleasant, discourtesy is also contagious. Every man on the ship will have some unpleasant experience that day that affects his attitude to the detriment of his work and the others that he comes in contact with. Our policy of not securing heads, passageways, and ladders for cleaning is a case in point. Those doing the cleaning need to appreciate that evolutions of substantial involvement go on 24 hours/day on a ship this size and some personnel have to get through the area being cleaned to get to their work. It is disruptive but it is also necessary. At

the same time those wanting to transit an area that is being cleaned must also appreciate the difficulty of cleaning and go another way or at least do everything possible to lessen the disruption.

Yes, courtesy is contagious. We have seen thousands of examples in IKE already where the general courtesy and positive attitude exhibited by even the newest members of the crew have had a major impact on our operational accomplishments and certainly on how visitors and guests see us. There has yet to be an inspecting team that has not said first and foremost that their time aboard was most enjoyable because of the way they were treated by the crew. The courtesy and cooperation and responsiveness of the IKE crew is our common denominator. It is the base from which ~~we~~ build ~~our~~ combat capability. It is in force and in action every day.

What does it all mean? It means a crew that can relate to each other as individuals can also pull together in a totally cohesive effort to accomplish any mission asked of it. It means that over 5000 navymen operate, maintain, and become a part of a billion dollar investment of the citizens of their country who they have sworn to defend. The better the crew, the better the ship, and the better the ship, the stronger the national defense force. It is ships like IKE that show potential adversaries the foolishness of war and consequently help maintain peace among the great nations. IKE is the most powerful offensive warship afloat and yet if her mission is training and readiness for 40 years, the investment of men and materials will have been worth it over and over again.

Where did it all start? It all started with 5000 men (not boys) contributing to their own environment. It started with a leadership throughout the chain of command that is in support of that environment, a leadership that is responsive to the daily needs and expectations of the whole, a leadership that has its sights set on mission accomplishment, but doesn't lose sight of wherein lies the strength of such a command, a leadership that is willing to make the sacrifices necessary to maintain that environment.

Only the keenest eye can find these differences in an organization chart or in a set of regulations, but they live in IKE. There can only be one team. There are not 16 departments competing against each other. There are not ship's company problems and Air Wing problems. There can only be a team of 5000 working directly for a Captain and working indirectly for a nation of mothers and fathers and old people and children and, yes, even dissidents who are free to speak their mind in a free society. Defense of that freedom is what it's all about. Yes, it is worth it.



E. W. CLEXTON, JR.

Distributions:
All Officers
All Chief Petty Officers

30 August 1981

COMMANDING OFFICER'S MEMORANDUM #6

Subj: Planning vs Crisis Management

"Everybody wants me to be planning things out ahead of time, but we end up doing everything by crisis management, so why waste my time planning things that never happen the way I plan them?" Have you ever said this or words to the same effect? I know I have. But let me try to answer the question without trying to convince you we don't or won't do things by crisis management in IKE. It would be unrealistic for me to say it won't happen, because the nature of our business frequently requires us to shift into a quick response mode of operations.

Many tasks end up being done at an unforeseen time or with a completely new twist and thus the resourcefulness of the Officers and Chief Petty Officers involved become a major determinant as to success or failure. Anyone in a service capacity (as we are in the service of our country) has to respond to the direction of his superiors whenever called upon or he fails in his duty. Our entire purpose in being in IKE is to be able to respond on call from our superiors whether it's a routine scheduled training event or an emergency obligation to do with national defense. If our superiors had known that a certain thing was going to happen, they would have planned it out and we would have known about it ahead of time. But when something happens on the world or national scene that requires a response and IKE is in a condition of readiness to contribute to that response, we'll do it. That is why we exist.

That is also why we must be continually striving to increase our level of training, so maximum personnel aboard know how to do their assigned jobs safely and efficiently. We never know when we'll be called upon to do our expected missions so we must be as competent as possible in all mission areas. This takes dedicated training time, not in conflict with maintenance time, but planned out so maximum benefit can be derived from the time available for training, maintenance, watch standing, cleaning and all other tasks assigned. Advance planning by the Planning Board for Training, and by all in a position of responsibility once the Planning Board has established the schedule, is the key to readiness in all areas.

Planning is the orderly arrangement of thoughts put down on paper by those responsible for planning so those responsible for execution can perform their part to successful completion. The planners and the executors can be the same people and frequently are on a ship's division level. Planning can be done by an individual and checked by others for completeness or it can be done by committee. The most important part of planning is to be realistic about how much can be accomplished in what length of time. The planner should try to consider all the major ways the plan could go wrong and then make the plan flexible enough to be able to adjust to the most likely glitches. Then when the plan is put into effect and one of the major elements is perturbed, those executing the plan can make the adjustments necessary and continue with the evolution.

The whole point to good planning is to accomplish an objective without crisis management. The more thought that has gone into the plan the greater the chance for efficient execution and the lesser the chance for major perturbation during execution. It comes down to "Take time now to save time later" or "Don't take time now and pay for it

in crisis management and frustration and time lost later." So, it's not expected that good planning eliminates crisis management, but good planning reduces the potential for crisis management significantly.

The thought processes that the planner goes through in developing a plan pay off during execution. If something alters the schedule, he has already considered that eventuality or one like it and is able to adjust with minimum interruption. Those changes are not crisis management; they are the right moves at the right time depending on what's actually happening. It may seem to be crisis management at the lowest level, but there's no preventing that unless you're able, and it's productive, to explain to all involved the reasons for the changes. Explanations are certainly appropriate and helpful when delays are experienced and the work force is idle, but explanations may not be necessary or even possible for every minor perturbation experienced.

There are varying degrees of how people perceive crisis management. The man at the "end of the whip" either flows with whatever is happening (the super adjustable type) or he bitches vehemently at every turn of events (the inflexible type) or he's somewhere in between. Middle managers don't like it because they find themselves in the position of having to overcome the hurdles as best able, and if they were not participants in the planning process, they perceive that the planners did a lousy job and may profess their feelings to those in their charge. This is a most serious error and certainly does not contribute to successful execution; it spreads turmoil and further aggravates the difficulties encountered. Those in charge at the top may have a grasp of how well or badly the evolution is going, but too often don't consider what the effect is to the men at the "end of the whip" when they make the adjustments necessary to accomplish the objective. They can be too far removed from reality. Needless to say, good communications is always essential in the execution of an event with good direction flowing down and good feedback flowing up. Establishment of such communications should be part of the plan.

Crisis management cannot be eliminated, but it can be reduced considerably at every level of management by good planning from inception right on through restoration following the event.


E. W. CLEPTON, JR.

Distribution:
All Officers
All CPOs



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
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15 September 1981

COMMANDING OFFICER'S MEMORANDUM #7

Subj: Thoughts on Respect (Up and Down)

A division will not perform anywhere near expectations without mutual respect flowing between the leaders and the workers.

Respect does not start up---no new Division Officer (CPO) walks into his division the first time and automatically has the men in that division feeling "he's the best damn Division Officer (CPO) on this ship."

Respect has got to start down. A leader that is new to a division has got to make one basic assumption, i.e....Every one of my men is going to be honest with me. If you have to swallow hard when you make that assumption...swallow. He knows that for his part he will always be honest with his men even if it turns out that some are not with him. If you don't agree with the first part of that sentence, throw this sheet away and don't read anything else I send you about leadership either; it'll be a waste of time. It is likely that some day (probably soon) one or more of his men will stretch the truth or be outright dishonest with him for their own personal gain. The Division Officer (CPO) is not naive, but after gathering the information available to him, he will back that man to the hilt if his judgement of the alleged injustice warrants it. He will "stick his neck out" and somewhere in the review chain the full truth will come out and the reviewing senior will "chop his head off"...and he'll look like a fool on the spot...

SO WHAT!...That is the essence of naval leadership...He has "gone to bat" for his men when in his judgement it was the right thing to do. He has displayed courage and conviction to his superiors even if they find his judgement amiss in this case. They will forget this incident but remember that he had the guts to stand up for what he believed to be right.

What has he accomplished? He has displayed his basic trust to the vast majority of his men--not due to this incident, but due to his first basic assumption with all his men---and he's the stronger for it and the division is in good hands.

The respect that initially flowed down will now begin to flow up. That first time won't be the last time, but I say again---SO WHAT! That mutual respect that flows between leaders and workers in any organization, be it a work center, a division, a department, or IKE as a whole, is critical to the internal functioning of that organization and to the combat readiness of the ship in the end.


E. W. CLEXTON JR.

Distribution:
All Officers
All Chief Petty Officers



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
USS DWIGHT D. ESENHOWER (CVN 69)
FPO NEW YORK 09532

30 September 1981

COMMANDING OFFICER'S MEMORANDUM #8

Subj: Personnel Advancement

It is incumbent on all of us in a supervisory capacity to ensure that we create the proper climate for advancement of IKE personnel. Our efforts must be positive, designed to motivate individuals, and demonstrate our interest in assisting each man in bettering himself.

Our goal is 100% participation in the advancement examination process by all personnel who satisfy the "basic eligibility" prerequisites of TIS and TIR.

It is not acceptable that our involvement terminate with identifying and recommending those individuals who are basically eligible and then leave them to their own devices in preparing themselves for the examination. It is in the area of preparation that we must become actively involved and take positive action. The only factors beyond an individual's control are TIS and TIR; therefore, it is imperative that we motivate our personnel to qualify in all other areas within their grasp. As a minimum, I expect each department to establish an advancement program that includes the following management actions:

After each examination cycle, i.e., every 6 months, identify personnel who will satisfy "basic eligibility" requirements for the next examination.

Establish a preparation requirements schedule for each man incorporating the following:

- Military Requirements Course
- Military Leadership Examination (if appropriate)
- Rate Training Course
- Practical Factors
- Professional PQS (if appropriate)
- General DC PQS
- 3M PQS
- Recommendation for advancement by Division Officer

Conduct training in support of advancement in rate.

Monitor preparation progress of each man.

Ensure preparation requirements are completed by each man three months prior to scheduled examination date with the exception of General DC PQS and 3M PQS, which must be completed within six months after reporting on board.

Submit monthly status report of advancement preparation to me.

A determination will have to be made by each one of you as to whether an individual reporting aboard from another command during a cycle will be able to adequately prepare

Our basic objectives are to instill a desire within each man to improve himself, to ensure that he is aware of and avails himself of the opportunities for advancement, and to ensure that he pursues a productive, progressive course during his tour. We can reasonably expect that the success of this program will be measured by increased retention both first-term and career and will be evident in the sincere appreciation of our personnel for the time and interest expended in their behalf.



E. W. CLEPTON, JR.

Distribution:
All Officers
All Chief Petty Officers



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER (CVN 69)
FPO NEW YORK 09532

15 October 1981

COMMANDING OFFICER'S MEMORANDUM #9

Subj: Indoctrination of the New Arrival

In a ship the size of IKE, we are receiving over 100 men each month of which over two-thirds are brand new to the Navy and are reporting to their first sea duty. The USN does a fair job getting these young men through basic training and even through "A" schools and special NEC training before they report to IKE for duty.


When they check in they are usually overwhelmed by all the things they need to learn. They don't know where they are going to work, who they will be working for, what it means or what it's like to be on a ship, what it means to operate an aircraft carrier at sea, where they'll sleep, where they'll eat, when they'll get some time off, when the ship will deploy, and a thousand other valid questions that need answers. If you can reflect back on when you reported to your first ship, you'll again appreciate how severe the cultural shock can be. This transition is especially difficult on an aircraft carrier because there are so many people and it seems like you never get to know your way around.

The first few weeks a new man is in a new environment are the most critical to his perceptions and his feelings for that organization. He can learn from the malcontent who has been aboard awhile or he can learn from the senior petty officers in his work center and his Chief Petty Officer. Which would you prefer? Who in fact knows what the Navy and IKE are all about? It's not that we don't all realize which way is best but will we be able to provide them the carefully directed guidance and leadership they seek and deserve. You are plenty busy with lots of priority tasks, and taking the time to properly indoctrinate the new arrival doesn't pay immediate dividends, but the long-term benefits derived from such an investment are extremely important to the overall productivity of your division and work centers. The feelings a new arrival generates within himself about his new environment (IKE) will most likely determine whether he'll be working with you for the next 3 1/2 years or working against you. We've all seen situations in our past where a group of men who are adequately trained to do a job can accomplish that job in a couple of hours or in a couple of days. The difference lies in the hearts of the men. The men that take days to accomplish the job are most likely disgruntled and frustrated, are probably working under duress, and the job, when completed, is invariably of minimum quality. The men that complete the job in hours know they are contributing to the capability of their ship, derive self (job) satisfaction from their efforts, and the work is normally of high quality.

Need I say again how critical the first few weeks a new man is aboard are to his performance while aboard, his division's productivity, and the overall capability of IKE?

All new arrivals need to be welcomed by the leadership in the division as well as by their peers. Besides learning what is expected of him in training and qualifications, he needs to know who he can turn to for assistance and counsel. The change in scenery has

undoubtedly had impact on his personal life as well as his professional life and he'll have to make adjustments both ways. There are plenty of guys around with time on their hands (shirkers) who can fill him in on the drug scene or ways/places to hide. If the leaders are not paying attention to him, they will. Your future and the future of IKE depends on his future. Make it productive and satisfying.



E. W. CLEXTON, JR.

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All Chief Petty Officer



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER (CVN 69)
FPO NEW YORK 09532

30 October 1981

COMMANDING OFFICER'S MEMORANDUM #10

Subj: Life

It should be obvious to all hands that the operation of the aircraft carrier, with the presence of aircraft, flammable liquids, and explosive ordnance, requires the most professional and highly trained personnel in the world. Every man who experienced the conflagration in ENTERPRISE, FORRESTAL or ORISKANY during the late sixties or NIMITZ this year will attest to the fact that a shortcut, a wrong move, or a lack of knowledge can cause, or contribute to, damage and loss of life. A shipboard fire is an unforgettable experience and whether the fire stems from enemy action or is self-inflicted through carelessness, the results can be devastating. Accordingly, our first order of business is to ensure that every possible step is taken to prevent fires and explosions. This is the most important phase of damage control. If all measures of prevention fail it is mandatory that all hands react quickly and correctly to contain fires, limit damage, restore vital systems and minimize injury and loss of life. When least expected - day or night - all hands may find themselves faced with a desperate situation demanding damage control skills.

With this in mind, however awesome, would you pass this test?

a. OOD's: Do you know how to maneuver the ship to prevent engulfing firefighters in smoke or to avoid spreading fires unnecessarily?

b. Department Heads:

(1) Would you bet your life that your men are adequately trained and qualified in firefighting and damage control?

(2) Have you asked all of your Division Officers how their DCPO Program is working? Did you like the answer?

c. Division Officer:

(1) Are you certain that your Damage Control PQS Program is effective: that you have all your required damage control equipment and that it will work right now?

(2) Can your men demonstrate proper use of an OBA? Can you?

d. LCPO: Have you personally checked the setting of proper material conditions in all of your division spaces this week?

e. Work Center Supervisor: Can you explain the proper care and use of every piece of damage control equipment in your work center?

f. All Hands:


(1) Do you know how to use every piece of damage control and survival equipment in your berthing compartment, your work center and at your watch station?

(2) Do you recognize when that equipment is not ready for instant service?

(3) Do you know your escape routes blindfolded?

(4) Do you understand that your life may depend on that knowledge?

If the answer to any of these questions is no, you have work to do. Get on with it. There has not been a ship lost to enemy action in many years, but we have lost several to fire and many more damaged. Look at the questions above again. Can you answer them with a yes? HONESTLY??



E. W. CLEXTON, JR.

Distribution:
All Hands



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
USS DWIGHT-D. ESENOWER (CVN 69)
FPO NEW YORK 09532

15 November 1981

COMMANDING OFFICER'S MEMORANDUM #11

Subj: Thoughts on the Mechanics of Leadership

We've discussed many aspects of leadership in past memos, but it's generally been from the pulpit with lots of abstract points to ponder. Many times circumstances just don't apply to one's particular division or work center because some of the hypothetical pieces just don't fit each puzzle. Every situation will be different because we're dealing with personal interrelations...strong leadership is perceptive and responsive leaders interacting with their informed and satisfied men. Leadership techniques are impossible to define and trying to explain why one is better than another is as difficult as trying to figure out the Captain's golf handicap!

There are certain basics though that a Division Officer (CPO) can learn and build upon. They are really the mechanics of the job and successful accomplishment at least puts him in a position to meet the total leadership challenge.

Some are: The Division Officer's Notebook: Knowing your men is one of the three basic building blocks for any naval leader and the Division Officer's Notebook is a mechanism which helps you get started. It's not a little green book in your back pocket; it's a useful and living reference that contains as much information (a la Privacy Act) as you feel is necessary to be informed when making decisions and to be responsive to each man as an individual. Keep it current. Use it in your interviews with your men. When it's nothing more to you than a binder to pass on to your relief, you've lost a valuable tool, and it won't be any good to your relief either.

Inspections: You should openly inspect your men at least weekly insisting on the highest standards of military bearing. Some seem to take forever to come around, but most will meet your standards and be proud of it. There's no easier means of recognizing your men through the forum of face-to-face inspections.

Your own inspections of your spaces (living and working) should be more critical than those from other officers in IKE or from outside activities. You should know the spaces better and be able to correct discrepancies as they occur rather than "learn to live with it." Maintain consistently high standards and you'll see results. You'll certainly have improved the environment where your men live and work. The impact of your inspections should be foremost...let the XO's inspection be anticlimatic, yet a source of pride for your division.

Advancement: I know of no military or civilian establishment where a man controls his own advancement more than the U. S. Navy. Each man can set his own sights and in most cases, achieve his goals. Even though the individual has got to provide the fuel for that drive to the top, the Division Officer (CPO) can often be the ignition. The information you need to help your men advance is certainly at your disposal in IKE, but you've got to use it. A stagnant division gets frustrated and a frustrated division doesn't care to advance themselves, etc., etc....and everybody gets out...and you end up with a division full of newly designated strikers instead of well-trained second class petty officers, etc., etc...! Monitoring the advancement of your men and frequent counseling for those that lack motivation or confidence is a critical Division Officer (CPO) task.

Training: Leading to advancement is the training your men receive. The Training PO is the bookkeeper. He is not the trainer. The Division Officer (CPO) has got to take an active part in the Division Training Program. Remember, one of the essential ingredients of leadership is to Know Your Job. Is there a better way to demonstrate your interest and your knowledge than to participate in divisional training? It is expected that the Division Officer (CPO) is frequently a lecturer on GMT subjects, but doesn't the opportunity quite often exist for him to pitch in on training for advancement in rate? You'll never know until you try, and neither of us will be surprised at the answer.

Involvement: This is more abstract than mechanical, but your involvement in division work and division play will do more for melding a division than anything else. "Khaki on the job" is the most obvious and powerful form of leadership...not usurping the authority you've rightfully delegated to your petty officers...not bypassing the chain of command you worked so hard to strengthen...but observing, getting to know your men on the job, learning from them, and letting them get to know you. Keep in mind that this involvement doesn't end at 1600. When your men are working a job that's going to take all night, your presence at 0200 makes one hell of an impact: motivation quadruples. It's your job too; you assigned your men to do it; they are your men.

Involvement at social gatherings can be just as productive. A division party without the leaders is nothing more than a "beer bust." Division parties with the leaders in attendance are a boon to division morale. Your presence promotes an esprit throughout the organization and for the organization rather than just "among the guys" if you're absent. Take your hits if you're a target; most are more humorous than you imagine. Deal with anyone that really does get out of line, although your men will probably beat you to it to save you the embarrassment. You'll undoubtedly get to know your men better, especially some that are a little stand-offish at work. Divisional parties tend to clear some of the cobwebs away...many are borne through misinformation or are just false perceptions anyway. There should be no ulterior motives in your attendance....just the intention to let your men expand equal to the amount they've been compressed.

I've only discussed a few of the mechanics of leadership. There are many more, some of which will be covered in the future, and there are different twists to every one depending on the individuals concerned. Think about them. Discuss leadership with your boss and with your immediate subordinates. Remember...effective naval leadership takes your dedicated time to develop and to mature.


E. W. CLEPTON, JR.

Distribution:
All Officers
All Chief Petty Officers



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER (CVN 69)
FPO NEW YORK 09532

30 November 1981

COMMANDING OFFICER'S MEMORANDUM #12

Subj: Thoughts on Starting Out or "Testing the New Leader"

Any new Division Officer (CPO) is going to get tested, and especially those that are inexperienced in their new role.

There will be tests to see if you can be bypassed by the next level in the chain of command. You're new and probably don't have the requisite knowledge to promptly answer a technical question that needs a quick response. You're not used to the inner workings of the department or the division. Your Department Head may go to your Chief for an answer or your Chief may go to the Department Head with a request. They don't mean to be bypassing the chain of command; they are just trying to get the job done. It's tough starting out. There are just too many things to learn too fast and you haven't even settled your travel claim yet. This is a critical stage. There is some natural melding time, but it is essential that you insert yourself into your proper place as quickly as possible while soliciting education from both sides as you go. Many a successful naval officer was properly "trained" by his Division Chief in his early years and carries those "gut" lessons with him for an entire career. If disinterest is noted by either side you'll be forever getting started. Perhaps more damaging than your own feelings of inadequacy will be the fact that your men will see that you're not exerting yourself and you'll be fighting an uphill battle in the leadership of your division.

You'll be tested early by your men. They'll try to see if they can get you to respond favorably to a request that they know the Chief would "shoot down" because they know he's more familiar with the situation and has probably reacted unfavorably to the same request in the past. Insistence on proper utilization of the chain of command has got to be your trump card. Your men know they should see their LPO or their Chief first, but some are going to try anyway, and when they hear it from you, you've just passed the test.

You'll be tested to see if you're just a "rubber stamp" Division Officer with no mind of your own. Backing your supervisors is certainly an essential key to effective naval leadership, but if you're not able to make a decision based on your own informed judgement of the situation, you might as well not be there to clutter up the chain of command. Because of your position and your mutual experiences with the supervisors in your division, your judgements will by-and-large coincide with those of your supervisors, but you are making the decision and you are accountable for your decisions. You cannot thrust them elsewhere if they didn't turn out to be the best ones. I might mention that there are times when backing a recommendation/decision of your supervisors is more important from a chain of command visibility standpoint than overturning or modifying it when the difference in impact of the choices is probably miniscule anyway.

YOU'LL BE TESTED ON SEEMINGLY SMALL POINTS TO SEE IF YOU ARE RESPONSIVE, TO SEE IF YOU CARE, TO SEE IF YOU VIEW YOUR MEN AS INDIVIDUALS OR AS A GROUP OF WORKERS WHEN IN FACT THERE ARE INDIVIDUAL PROBLEMS TO BE SOLVED. THE RESULTS OF THESE "MINOR" TESTS ARE BY NO MEANS OF MINOR

CONSEQUENCE. DOES FAIRNESS MEAN THE SAME ANSWER TO THE SAME QUESTION REGARDLESS OF THE PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES? NO. SOMETIMES IT DOES, BUT SOMETIMES IT DOESN'T. FAIRNESS IS PERCEIVED IN THE HEARTS OF YOUR MEN AND INVARIABLY HAS MORE TO DO WITH THE INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED THAN WITH THE SUBSTANCE OF THE REQUEST. THE MEN THAT PERFORM EQUALLY WELL SHOULD GET RECOGNITION AND EQUAL CONSIDERATION, BUT MOST OF THE TIME, THINGS REALLY AREN'T ALL THAT EQUAL. THERE ARE ALSO TIMES WHEN BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS PREVAIL WHETHER A MAN IS A TOP 10% OR A BOTTOM 10%. THE RIGHT ANSWER CANNOT BE WRITTEN DOWN; IT EXISTS IN YOUR MIND AS YOU VIEW EACH AND EVERY REQUEST.

Testing is prevalent in all units. The new leader that shys away from the tests, fails. The leader that jumps at the challenge, wins. He'll make mistakes; they will be honest mistakes. The decision he makes has got nothing to do with the test, for if his decision is based on the fact that he's being tested, he fails the test regardless of the decision. The decision has to be based on his best judgement. His decision may not parallel a similar situation in another division. It is expected that through common training most similar circumstances will be handled similarly throughout the command, and we certainly learn from each other, but that is not the essence of the decision. It is an individual decision by a Division Officer that only he can make, and he can only grow by making it. There are many others in IKE that can make recommendations and broaden his horizons on matters that may impact on his decision, but it is his alone.


E. W. CLEPTON, JR.

Distribution

All Officers

All Chief Petty Officers



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER (CYN 69)
FPO NEW YORK 09532

15 December 1981

COMMANDING OFFICER'S MEMORANDUM #13

Subj: Mobility

Every man whether he be a bluejacket, a salesman, an executive or a longshoreman needs to feel that he has mobility, that he is going somewhere, or that he at least has the opportunity to improve his lot in life. Of all the military and civilian endeavors with which I am familiar, there is no place where a man can advance himself as fast and as far as he wants as in the U.S. Navy. The key word in the last sentence of course is he.

When a young man first joins up, he is limited only by his basic battery scores and his own determination. It is indeed unfortunate that some begin early in their Navy careers to close some of the doors available to them by violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. However, there must always be ways for a man to overcome past lapses of performance or conduct if he engenders the strength within himself, takes counsel from his superiors, and works diligently against the odds to better himself. From the supervisor's viewpoint, it is never right to "kick a man when he's down." Each man that has fallen from favor needs incentives to be able to regain his dignity among his peers and from those he works for. We should never give up on a man until he has given up on himself. Considering the age and oft-times early stage of maturity of most of our new men, we should be able to look beyond the immediate problems of a young man, who has apparently given up on himself, and continue to seek ways to counsel and assist him. It is also not right that an inordinate amount of our supervisors' time be spent counseling those that truly don't care for themselves or their obligations to country, and in these cases our divisions are better served by ridding ourselves of those few through administrative separations.

Leaving behind the negative side, mobility is ensuring that those personnel who will, should, or could be the Chief Petty Officers of the future and those that have the potential to go on to commissioned Warrant and LDO grades be assisted in every way to gain the experiences that will make them better. It is my intention to support such men in the attainment of their goals (even if it means their departure from IKE). I only classify such personnel as those in the upper half of their division. It is proper recognition for those that work the hardest in IKE; those that clearly stand above the average. Even if their plans for a naval career are not clear, if they are clearly upper-half in your organization they are deserving of our support in recognition of their efforts in IKE, where we ask more of each man than in any other field of endeavor. The approach is two-fold: if the man is a better-than-average worker here, he will most likely be an above average contributor wherever he goes and the Navy benefits as well as the man; conversely if his efforts are not upper-half, then he's not displaying the personal motivation to succeed elsewhere and it is not fruitful for the command or the Navy to thrust him elsewhere. Our own Striker Board reflects this same policy for relatively new personnel; a man must prove himself where he is before he can expect approval for a move within the command. On the other side of the ledger, no one is allowed to thrust their non-performers on anyone else. It must be clear that the first step on the road to success is to be successful where you are. Once that is established then the entire chain of command will support either lateral moves or upward mobility as the case dictates.

It is important that each division look within itself and satisfy itself that those that are working the hardest and contributing the most are being rewarded for their efforts by being placed in positions of higher responsibility and more visibility. And if those top few feel that they would like to see what another part of the Navy is like, or be in another location, then I am for it.

It is common for us to require a "relief onboard" from the Bureau, but in most cases you need only look in the back rank at quarters - those are the reliefs. That is what our endless emphasis on training is all about. That 3rd class Work Center Supervisor that you "can't afford to lose" probably started in that back rank two years ago, and if you are meeting your training obligations seriously you have already got an onboard relief. We thereby not only provide mobility for the petty officer, but also for the SN/AN/FN that he has trained and is also upper-half. It is a losing battle to expect the Bureau to fill in your gaps in middle-grade petty officer billets - fill 'em yourself. If a man is working in a rating that an "A" School is not a prerequisite for petty officer, get him through his courses and make him a designated SN/AN/FN. Award him that recognition for his knowledge in the rating from hands-on experience. He may not be the best you've ever seen, but he may become better than you think when afforded that extra recognition. Make the key dates in the advancement cycle key dates in your division. Get your men teaching each other to minimize the number of failures. Do some of the major lessons yourselves with your men at training sessions. Force the issue. Rid your divisions of low grade stagnation where we have cumulatively hundreds of E1's and E2's aboard with 2 and 3 years in the Navy. Push all your men to petty officer, even those that say they don't care. Assign extra hours of supervised study for those that are behind in their qualification, if necessary, but push advancement at every opportunity. If a man can't make it up the ladder in the Navy where the path is relatively easy, he'll never make it up the ladder in life. These early years are the years where he needs to determine whether he's got what it takes or not. If we push someone to petty officer that shouldn't be one, he'll let us know soon enough by his performance or conduct. If he insists on doing what non-petty officers are more likely to do (UA, drugs, etc.), then I'll take him back to E3 or below. Many that you are not so sure about will take hold once they are petty officers and prove you wrong. The end result will be higher morale (and retention) in your division, a higher standard of living, more responsible behavior, better training for your lower rated personnel, more help in running the division, and many other side benefits.

I lump this all under mobility because when you've done your best in training your men and seeing to their advancement, you'll attain a higher level of competency within the division. You will be better able to "let go" of the top performers to pursue a well rounded naval career, and you will have attained mobility for each hard charger, be he SN/AN/FN or Second Class Petty Officer.


E. W. CLEPTON, JR.

Copy to:
All Officers
All Chief Petty Officers



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER (CVN 69)
FPO NEW YORK 09532

30 December 1981

COMMANDING OFFICER'S MEMORANDUM #14


Subj: Thoughts on Communications

We've spoken previously about knowing your job in the context of technical knowledge, but there's a wealth of knowledge aboard IKE that you are expected to know and that can be most damaging to you and your division if you don't. That's knowledge of IKE and Navy organizations, directives, procedures, etc., etc., etc... How can you keep your men informed if you're "in the dark" yourself? Most IKE directives have been written by an appropriate officer, technically reviewed by a department head, reviewed for acceptability by the XO, and accepted as command policy by the CO. We'll all run into situations that could have been handled a better way than prescribed, but by-and-large the written policy will be appropriate, and all hands are expected to adhere to it. To effectively administer a division in IKE it will be necessary for the Division Officer (CPO) to know the ground rules. Ignorance of command policy at the Division Officer (CPO) level is self-destructive to the command and the division. Your men could be misinformed which is even worse than not being informed at all.

Speaking of being informed... One of the most valuable leadership tools a Division Officer (CPO) has is the steady flow of information to his men about what we're doing, where we're going, what's next, why we did what's-n-such, when we're going to finish, etc., etc., etc... None of us know the answers to all the questions and a lot of answers have to be qualified, but at least daily we generate or learn some bit of information that can be passed on to our men. Stability in scheduling is something we must all strive to attain. It is extremely difficult on an aircraft carrier, because of the myriad missions and the limited assets available to respond to the international situation. A division that is not informed becomes a rumor hive and rampant rumors are totally disruptive to men that are trying to plan their own lives and the lives of their families based on the best information they have available. "I don't know" is sometimes the only answer, but it doesn't mean you can't find out. Maybe you'll discover a break in the flow of information through the chain of command; maybe the answer is available. Keeping the information flowing will allow your men to plan, it will soothe some worries so they can devote more time to productivity, it will prevent frustrations from building up due to a lack of knowledge.

The attainment of effective communications in any organization assumes that it is two-way. Listening is a virtue that too few of us practice. There's a difference between letting the other guy talk and actually hearing what he is saying. A responsive leader hears what his men are telling him. If we only hear what we want to hear or we stereotype the individual because he said what we thought he would say, we're not really listening.

The attainment of good communications within an organization is not an easy task... The larger the organization, the more difficult it becomes. It, like most other aspects of naval leadership, takes dedicated time and effort by the leader... But, it's worth it.


E. W. CLEXTON, JR.

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All Officers
All Chief Petty Officers



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER (CVN 69)
FPO NEW YORK 09532

15 January 1982

COMMANDING OFFICER'S MEMORANDUM #15

Subj: Doing It Right The First Time

1. The following is from an official report about a class ALPHA fire that occurred on a cargo ship in the Mediterranean:

"Fire out, last of three reflash about 1000, no additional reflash anticipated because probable sources eliminated, will maintain reflash watches for approximately next 24 hours."

"This fire was second fire of the day. First occurred about 0450 when MAA making rounds discovered smoke in Crew's Lounge (compartment 2-125-4-L). Called away duty fire party which extinguished fire of dismembered corn broom under cushioned chair. Once fire out about 0500 word passed on IMC fire out. All hands urged get more sleep before reveille."

"About 0535, BM2 who had been up for first fire went forward on cargo deck (i.e. enclosed main deck over cargo holds) to his deck division gear locker on cargo deck forward starboard to start day. When over hold two he saw smoke forward, grabbed CO2 extinguisher and ran forward but found very heavy smoke. Thereafter he ran aft to get to port side and on looking forward saw flames in vicinity of expanded metal box type cage that contained fiberglass lifejackets. BM2 then ran out on main deck and yelled "fire over hold one" to quarterdeck watch (amidships). DCA and leading HT on quarterdeck immediately ran forward on cargo deck and rigged then applied fire hose. Almost instantly voluminous smoke became overpowering in forward cargo deck over cargo hold one. DCA and HT had to abandon hose and relocate aft to combat fire."

"First called away duty inport fire party then quickly reassessed situation; more firefighters needed. Word then passed on IMC for all repair parties to man stations to fight fire. Remaining personnel muster on helo deck; phoned for rescue and assistance support. Non-involved personnel on ship were later evacuated to pier to preclude entrapment on ship with single brow potential fire area."

"Fire quickly spread to cargo and deck gear in cargo deck over hold one, including items of cardboard and wooden packaging of such items as household insecticide, disinfectant, hydraulic fluid, general purpose grease, forms (including W-2), paint rollers, electronic equipment, RAS division gear, and general deck equipment of UNREP ship."

"Ship did not go to GQ in view all GQ repair parties called away as action appropriate to situation. Repair parties swung into action quickly to contain fire with major problem voluminous dark/gray smoke. CO established priority one; keep fire away from hold two (4 levels mostly various degrees of flammable material, paint and grease bottom level), priority two; keep fire out of hold one (less flammable, 'Fleet Issue Load List' material) on basis fire in hold two potentially catastrophic and would spread all the way forward in ship and aft into hold three (refrigeration). Cargo doors port and starboard side of fire area were closed; unable to open due power secured and manual controls inside inaccessible. Accordingly had to fight fire from aft-forward, hampered by deck-staged cargo."

"In meantime, Rescue and Assistance Detail personnel from other ships arrived on scene to assist. Radioed request for OBA canisters and OBA's to ships at pier which were provided promptly. As personnel began to arrive on pier, CO assigned XO as Pier Coordinator. City fire department arrived on scene with two pump trucks, one snorkel ladder truck, and one ambulance. Due to potential language problems and potential danger to personnel in unfamiliar ship environment, CDO limited participation to observation and hose/water assistance from pier to forecastle. Local police also assisted on scene. Tug arrived and used two fire monitors on starboard side of hull for approximately 5 minutes. Had grease and paint stowed topside at RAS station one; fire hoses played on cans and surrounding decks/bulkheads until moved clear aft. With need to clear out smoldering material, city firemen played hose on port side and observed on ship. Fire raged over hold one until forklift trucks with drivers in OBA's under fire hose protection got cargo out of fire area. It was then possible to get at smoldering/burning material and get fire under control."

"Fire considered under control approximately 0930, with determination no fire either hold one or two."

"Sprinkler in 3/50 ready service locker, compartment 1-20-0-M, just forward fire area activated, protecting approximately 500/5 rounds ammo. Supplemented sprinkler system with two 2 1/2 inch hoses through passing scuttles, also cooled cargo deck/RAS locker bulkhead with applicator through cut access in 01 level."

"Cut firefighting accesses in 01 level port and starboard sides over fire area above hold one; also fought fire through hatch in compartment 01-35-0-L over fire area. Cut accesses through transverse bulkhead aft of fire area. Cut/rammed with forklift accesses in cargo doors port and starboard over hold one."

"Damage:

A. Cargo: Small amount limited to cargo in fire area on cargo deck. Very minor water damage to non-critical cargo in holds one and two (mostly packaging).

B. Hull: Preliminary assessment still no structural damage although 01 level over fire area buckled. Much insulation and pipe lagging destroyed over holds one and two plus some hold one level on overhead scorched. Extensive smoke damage cargo deck hold two forward."

"Personnel injuries: Approximately 40 persons overcome by smoke to some degree initially treated pierside and were then sent to support ship for further evaluation. Support ship subsequently provided medical care to total 105 persons involved in fire-fighting onboard. No major injuries encountered. Majority of personnel were treated for minor burns and smoke inhalation. Three crew members admitted: one for back strain, one for corneal abrasion and smoke inhalation, and one for minor burn left thigh."

"With extreme amount of all combustible material cargo and packaging/handling carried, a rapidly spreading fire such as experienced had real potential for catastrophic results. We were extremely fortunate that firefighters succeeded in keeping fire out of both holds one and two. Had fire this instance gotten to/resulted in hold two, situation could have been a disaster."

"This incident was an absolutely magnificent example of all-command teamwork between a ship in distress and all USN commands in area aggressively and effectively combining resources and capabilities."

"Incident demonstrated value of aggressive damage control PQS training, proper setting of Material Condition, and rapid/flexible response of backup personnel."

2. There are many lessons in here for us; careful stowage of flammables, alert watchstanders, readiness of Inport Emergency Teams and Rescue and Assistance Details, value of all hands knowledge of firefighting and damage control techniques, etc. The end result is a ship's crew saving their own ship from catastrophe and their shipmates lives. We've got all the ingredients in IKE for something like this to happen and I'm also sure we've got the emergency teams and the crew to prevent such an incident from becoming a tragedy.


E. W. CLEXTON, JR.

Distribution:

All Members Inport Emergency Teams
All Members Rescue & Assistance Details
All Members "R" Division
Department Heads
Division Officers*
Division LCPO's*

* To be promulgated to ALL HANDS at divisional quarters.



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER (CYN 69)
FPO NEW YORK 09532

30 January 1982

COMMANDING OFFICER'S MEMORANDUM #16

Subj: Cleanliness/Habitability/Sanitation

The following is quoted from a personal message from COMNAVAIRLANT to carrier and shore station commanding officers:

"Habitability is of major concern in improving the quality of life aboard our ships and air stations. We are spending millions of dollars to improve living conditions, but we are failing in the most basic of all habitability efforts, that of cleanliness. I am concerned by the shabby, dirty condition of some shipboard and shore station spaces, and by the similarly scruffy appearance of some of our personnel.

Inspections by Force Medical and Supply Teams often reveal that the most basic of efforts are not always succeeding. Spaces are dirty, and people are dirty. For example, some sailors are seen in sick bay wearing no underwear. They have worn the same greasy dungarees for days on end. This condition threatens the esthetic senses and the health and well being of all onboard. Because men have to work in fire rooms that are hot, on grimy flight decks or in and under aircraft does not mean they should have to bathe in foul smelling heads or sleep in berthing cluttered with debris and dirt.

The heart of this problem in most instances, is the failure of our middle managers, division officers, chief petty officers and petty officers to make cleanliness happen. However, Commanding Officers must give the problem their strongest support if we are to succeed.

Flight deck, engineering and maintenance personnel work long hours under close supervision and in mission-critical roles. I submit to you that the work of the compartment cleaner is no less urgent. That individual must be trained, supervised and rewarded when work is up to standards.

The keel and rudder of habitability is cleanliness. An aging and hard used warship can show pride in her spaces and personnel if she is meticulous in cleanliness and uniform. Cleanliness and order can bring major improvements in the quality of life aboard ships. In morale and health, and in retention, when rationally pursued. Some units both afloat and shore are up to standards and they are to be commended. However, the range of quality across AIRLANT is staggering and the difference is top level management concern and action. Get your medical departments involved and let us move out smartly. This is one we can do something about now and within our existing resources. I challenge you to find the solution to this problem."

To put this in "IKEese," we do a good job of keeping most spaces clean and habitable, but we also have some spaces that just never seem to get up to the standards met by most others. Habitability is most certainly a function of environment and we (in charge)


establish the environment. It takes continuous attention to detail (sweepers, daily Division Officer inspections, weekly Department Head inspections, etc).

IKE is not an aging and hard used ship. Our spaces are not dirty and our people are not dirty. Some of both may be, but the vast majority are not. By and large, our heads are not foul smelling and our berthing compartments are not cluttered with debris and dirt. All these comments are relative and nobody can deny that their spaces could be better. Why is the subject of cleaning and environment stressed so much in IKE? Because this is our home; this is where we work and eat and sleep; this is where we interact with each other, both in the conduct of our business (mission accomplishment) and in our personal lives. The dignity of each man in IKE is better served by all in IKE striving to maintain the environment at the highest level possible.

It is interesting to note that if you feel your spaces are not kept up to standard, the problem can often be in your own communications. Your people will meet your standards. The difference is in your actions and communications. If you don't inspect frequently and direct correction of discrepancies, your people perceive that as testimony that environment is a lower priority for you and they meet that perceived expectation. So, if you think your spaces don't meet your standards, you're just not communicating your standard by all the means available to your men, because they are meeting your standard - the one you actually accept.

Do you have trouble explaining to your compartment cleaners how their tasks support mission effectiveness, not just for the division or squadron, but for the whole ship? I don't. As the Commanding Officer, with the overview of every department and squadron's contribution, I see daily the role that the environment plays in overall mission accomplishment. It is analogous to the requirement for feeding it has to do with needs. It is easy to see that if we didn't feed everybody for a few days we would be out of business in a hurry, as far as our mission as a warship goes. Well, if we allow our environment to deteriorate we quickly affect the general psyche of all our men, or at least those in the spaces that aren't kept up. They will unconsciously be trying to satisfy their need for security in their surroundings instead of devoting their efforts to their jobs. They are "turned-off" by their surroundings, their efficiency drops, their morale is impacted, and their contribution to ship's mission is adversely affected. That is why I don't have any problem explaining how those that do the cleaning contribute to ship's mission. Guided by you, they help set and maintain the environment where all others live, work, eat and sleep. Yes, I am talking about the guy who cleans the head and the berthing area or the guy who cleans the work space or passageways, often along with his other divisional duties. His is a very real contribution to mission accomplishment by ensuring a clean and comfortable environment for all others in his division or squadron.

So don't ever get caught separating cleaning and sanitation and habitability (all contributors to environment) from mission accomplishment. The cleanliness and sanitation "ball" is not just in Medical's or Supply's court; it's not just for mess men and compartment cleaners - this is one game we all play.



E. W. CLEXTON, JR.

Distribution:
All Officers
All Chief Petty Officers



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER (CVN 69)
FPO NEW YORK 09532

15 February 1982

COMMANDING OFFICER'S MEMORANDUM #17


Subj: The Junior Officer Dilemma

There is a dilemma that just about every new officer faces and it is perhaps the toughest hurdle in his early development. It goes something like this - "How can I truly be the boss, the guy in charge, the leader of a group of people who are more experienced, better trained and probably more acclimated to the technical skills required of my division?" or "How can I, with no previous experience in the field, direct the efforts of a Chief Petty Officer and senior petty officers, who have spent their entire naval experience working in the line of endeavor that I'm in charge of?" My earlier memorandum on Naval Leadership (3 JUL 81) stated that the officer (CPO) had to fulfill his technical obligations to his chain of command as well as his leadership obligations to his men, although the thrust of that memorandum was to stress the leadership aspects. The problem is, however, that much of the interaction with his subordinates is along technical lines, and he has to gain their respect in that area, as well as respect for his abilities as their "personnel manager." What this all means is that the officer has to learn the job of his men as completely and as quickly as possible. HE HAS TO STUDY. I say again - HE HAS TO STUDY: That is why we only commission those that are already expert in their technical fields (LDO/CWO), or those that have the proven intellectual capacity (college graduates) to study and comprehend the intricacies of a new subject and eventually to master it. It doesn't happen overnight and that is why this dilemma of being in charge, but not being as technically competent as his subordinates, is frequently the most serious dilemma facing the new officer. But it also shouldn't take a year to become technically competent. By the time a year is up even the best personnel manager will have lost the respect of his men if he is not able to comprehend the problems they have with their equipment or their assignments to operate and/or maintain it. The officer, in fact, should, in the course of his first few months, be able to comprehend the inner workings and design criteria of the equipment better than even his senior petty officers, because he should be better equipped to study and comprehend the intricacies of the systems. What he is lacking during this stage, that his immediate subordinates are so strong in, is operating experience. The only way to fill the experience void is to be out "on the job" with the men and find out what the realities (as they may differ from intended design parameters or theory) of operations are. Because of his coincident study the officer will actually be able to apply practical operation to theory and thereby better understand the limitations and safety precautions that sometimes aren't so obvious to the lesser trained men. They learn them, and hopefully follow them, but don't necessarily understand them.

There is another element of this education process, and that is the responsibility of the young officer's chief. Just as the chief is expected to help train a new officer in the realities of Navy divisional leadership, there is the equivalent obligation and responsibility to help train him in the technical field. A chief who lets a new officer flounder and lose the respect of his men because he doesn't know anything about their work, need only look in the mirror to find the fault for a division that doesn't have strong leadership at the top

(the division officer). The chief's job is to make the division officer look good; not superficially, but really good because he (the division officer) is competent and has the respect of his whole division. Such divisions have high productivity, good morale and gain job satisfaction from their work. The new officer can learn the theory behind the practice, but it is the chief who is best suited to assist that officer in understanding the actual application of the equipment in the operating environment. The chief plays an even greater role in easing the new officer's dilemma of being in charge but not being that well equipped, early on, to handle all the duties and responsibilities of a division officer. The role is not to take over those duties and responsibilities, and thereby make him feel alienated and inadequate when he (the division officer) knows from his limited training and from what his department head has told him, that they are his responsibilities. The role is rather to teach, to train, to help the new officer through the early months, to build him up, to advise him about various courses of action including the pitfalls inherent in some as only learned through experience, but to let him decide. For proper development the new officer must make the decisions that are appropriately his and he will become even stronger, faster, if a few of them are wrong, so he can learn from them. He must experience making some early mistakes so he finds out how to swallow a mistake, how to admit he made one, and how to make corrections for his errors. If the new officer is shy and/or uncomfortable with his leadership role, taking over only prolongs the adjustment period and detracts from the job at hand - that is, leadership of the division.

As usual, I've not provided any quick sure-fire way to solve the stated dilemma except that the officer has to study and the chief has to help. It sounds simple, but you know that it's most frequently tedious and complex. Just make sure, whether you be new officer or experienced chief, that the end product is clear: a well trained officer, technically competent as well as capable of fulfilling his divisional leadership duties, and a smooth running division ever capable of performing its mission.


E. W. CLEXTON, JR.

Distributions
All Officers
All Chief Petty Officers



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER (CVN 69)
FPO NEW YORK 09532

28 February 1982

COMMANDING OFFICER'S MEMORANDUM #18

Subj: Grammaticcs

There are two words in the English language that very seldom have applicability when communicating within a military chain of command; one is THINK, and the other is THE Y.

The word THINK used in the first person "I think..." is generally not acceptable in response to a member of the chain of command seeking information. It is acceptable if the question is intended to solicit thoughts or ideas, but not when the answer to the question will result in action being taken up or down the chain of command. When the senior is being asked the question, his word is taken as "gospel" by both the questioner and anyone else in earshot who might not realize the words "I think..." qualify the answer. Such answers by seniors become the source of extensive rumoring in a very short time. Men that do not participate in the decision making process can only go on what they hear, directly or indirectly (rumor), from their seniors. They make personal plans on the basis of what they hear; their morale hinges on what they hear is going to happen; their immediate lives are totally dependent on what they hear (and see) in their work center and division. The notable exceptions are what they read in the SORM or the POD and too many times what they have read and what they hear are different. They are accountable for what appears in the SORM and the POD but often what they read becomes hazy in past memory and is easily overshadowed by what they have recently heard.

Rumoring is dangerous and contagious. Many times rumoring leads to wide-spread frustration once the straight word is published or reiterated. Rumoring is too frequently confined to how things are going to get better or how something unattainable is going to be attainable. The right answer is available. Sometimes it takes a little research in the books or a solicitation up the chain of command, but it is available. Sometimes the answer may be "I don't know" or "It hasn't been decided yet," but at least those answers are correct and cannot be the source of widespread (erroneous) rumoring.

The use of the word THINK by a junior can be just as damaging. When the junior is being asked the question, the senior is looking for facts. He has to act on the answers he gets from his subordinates. If time is of the essence, an answer that was originally preceded by "I THINK..." will proceed up the chain of command rapidly without the THINK included and result in a decision that could easily be the wrong decision when based on incomplete or erroneous information. Wrong decisions result in improper direction of manpower and material when work has to be redone the right way. A junior that gives an erroneous answer to prevent himself from appearing ignorant is doing the command and eventually himself grave damage because of the eventual decisions that may be made based on that information. It is far better to say "I don't know, but I'll find out" than to guess at the answer. Such straightforward honesty in dealing with the chain of command builds respect and trust for future exchanges which far outweighs the temporary embarrassment of a negative response. The boss may exhibit disgruntlement during that exchange but he'll learn to know answers are correct and that the man can be depended on in the future.

Another trap that juniors in the chain of command sometimes get caught in is answering the boss with answers that they THOUGHT the boss wanted to hear or expected

to hear. The boss has got to have the right answer, not a fabricated one or one that is so disguised with self-protection, excuses or half-truths that he can't make a clean (and appropriate) decision with the information presented. He'll end up passing along a lot of conjecture, stated as such or not, to his boss just muddying up the facts of the matter. Policy could result from such information that would not necessarily be in the best interests of the command or the crew because everyone THOUGHT the boss wanted it a certain way. The boss might have in fact been in favor of a different (and better) direction but relented to what seemed like overwhelming recommendations another way (all perceived as what they THOUGHT the boss wanted).

Another aspect of the exchange of information up and down the chain of command is the correction of previously stated erroneous information. It takes a man to admit that a decision he has made may have not been the best one as things turn out. Admission leads to the correction of inefficiencies or the righting of wrongs. If things didn't turn out for the best; think it out again; rescind the previous (wrong) decision; make the best decision as currently evident and carry on. Don't let vanity or pride prevent the correcting of a wrong decision when your men or the productivity of your division/work center is suffering from it and there is a better way.

The word THEY used in an explanatory answer is a "cop-out." If something has gone wrong or something that you are responsible for isn't quite working the way it's supposed to, THEY means anybody and everybody else, but not me. Anytime you are receiving or passing information up or down the chain of command you should establish who the source of your information is and not be so vague as to refer everything back to the untraceable THEY. Seniors who refer to THEY when passing information or orders down the chain of command to their subordinates are not accepting their responsibilities to the command in the enforcement of those orders or the policies of the command. The junior loses respect rapidly for a boss that continually "blames" assignments on the chain of command. He is also the type who "blames" his men (THEY) when he's not seen his job to completion and is held accountable by his boss. He holds the title of his billet, and he enjoys the privileges that go with it, but he is hardly fulfilling his responsibilities, and he is no leader.

When THEY are referred to as the source of information flowing up the chain of command, we experience the same frustration and probability of incorrect decisions as those that result from answers that begin with "I THINK..." Every level of the chain of command has to act on information it receives and the only way to progress and accomplish the tasks at hand is for that information to be factual and as timely as possible. This can only come from leaders and supervisors, officers and petty officers, that strive for technical competence in their fields and who deal with each other and with their men in a totally honest environment.

Listen to yourself and those you work with — is "I THINK..." a frequently used phrase of yours? Do most of your answers to your boss or to your men include a reference to THEY?



E. W. CLEXTON, JR.

Distribution:
All Officers
All Chief Petty Officers



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER (CVN 69)
FPO NEW YORK 09532

15 March 1982

COMMANDING OFFICER'S MEMORANDUM #19

Subj: Article entitled "Damn Exec"

I don't bring this enlightening article to your attention because of the title, but because of the lesson we could all relearn from time to time. I don't hear specifically "Damn Exec" in IKE very often, but I have heard Petty Officers backing off from leadership positions by use of similar phrases. This falls into the "if the shoe fits, wear it" category. Use it for your own purposes, because of its value at all levels of the chain of command.

"DAMN EXEC"

The Norfolk wind was streaking the water of Hampton Roads as the Commanding Officer stepped from his car, slammed the door, and straightened his cap. As he approached the pier head a sailor stepped from the sentry hut and saluted.

"Good morning, Captain."

"Good morning, Kowalski," answered the Captain. He took pleasure in the fact that he knew the sailor's name. Kowalski was a good sailor. He had served his entire first cruise in the ship and did his work well.

The Captain noticed that over his blues Kowalski wore a deck force foul weather jacket, faded, frayed, dirty, and spotted with red lead. "Little chilly this morning," said the Captain as he walked by. "Yes sir, sure is," replied the sailor with his usual grin.

As the Captain approached his Quarterdeck there was the usual scurrying of people, the gongs sounded, and the Command Duty Officer came to the Quarterdeck. Salutes and cheerful "good mornings" were exchanged, and the Captain continued to his cabin.

The CDO looked over the Quarterdeck and frowned. "Let's get this brightwork polished, chief."

"It's already been done once this morning, sir," replied the OOD.

"Well, better do it again. The Exec will have a fit if he sees it this way," said the CDO.

"Yes sir," answered the OOD.

As soon as the CDO had left, the OOD turned to his messenger, "Go tell the duty boatswain's mate that the CDO wants the brightwork done over again on the Quarterdeck."

Later that morning the Captain was going over some charts with the ship's Executive Officer. The Captain had just finished his coffee and lighted a cigarette. "I noticed our pier sentry in an odd outfit this morning. He had a foul weather jacket on over his blues; it looked pretty bad."

"Yes, sir. Well, it gets cold out there, and these deck force boys have mighty bad looking jackets," the Exec said.

The Captain felt the Exec had missed his point and said, "Oh, I realize they have to wear a jacket, but for a military watch like that, I'd like to see them wear peacoats when it's cold."

The CDO was talking with the Third Class Boatswain's Mate on the fantail when the Quarterdeck Messenger found him. When told that the Executive Officer wanted to see him, Graven ended his discussion with, "There, hear that? He probably wants to see me about the brightwork. I don't care how many men it takes to do it, the Exec told me to be sure to get that brightwork polished every morning."

The Executive Officer indicated a chair to the CDO and they both sat down: "How's it going these days?" asked the Exec. In the past few months, since he had taken over as Senior Watch Officer, he seemed to have more problems than usual.

"Okay, I guess," he replied with a forced grin. He knew that things were not as they used to be. It seemed strange, too, because everyone on the ship had been so glad to be rid of the previous senior watch officer, that "damn" Senior Watch Officer. The junior officers even had a special little beer bust at the club to celebrate the former Senior Watch Officer's leaving and his "fleeing up" to senior watch officer. Now the Exec was always after him. The junior officers didn't help much either, always complaining about the Exec. Maybe the Exec was taking over as "the heel" now that the former Senior Watch Officer was gone.

"That's good," said the Exec, "here's a little thing that you might look into. These men that stand pier watches have to wear a jacket, but the foul weather jacket doesn't look good for a military watch. I'd like to see them wear their peacoats when it's cold." He had expected something like this, more of the Exec's picking on him. He responded properly, got up, and left.

He told the First Lieutenant: "The Exec says the pier head sentries can't wear foul weather jackets anymore. If it's cold they can wear peacoats," he added.

"But the peacoats will get dirty and then what about personnel inspections?" asked the First Lieutenant.

"I don't know, but if the Exec wants peacoats, we give him peacoats!"

"Peacoats!" said the Chief Boatswain's Mate, "Who says so?"

"That's what the Exec wants," said the First Lieutenant, "so let's give him peacoats."

"The Exec says peacoats for the pier sentries when it's cold," announced the Chief to his boatswain's mates.

A Third Class Boatswain's Mate walked away from the group with a buddy, turned and said, "That Damn Exec, first I got to have all my men polish brightwork on the Quarterdeck, now they got to wear peacoats on sentry duty instead of foul weather jackets!"

Seaman Kowalski's relief showed up at the sentry booth at 1150. "Roast beef today," constituted the relieving ceremony.

"Good, I like roast beef," was the reply. "Hey, how come the peacoat?"

"Damn Exec's idea," said the relief. "We can't wear foul weather gear no more out here, only peacoats."

"Damn Exec," agreed Kowalski, "Captain didn't say nothin' when he came by."

"The Captain's okay, it's just that Damn Exec. He's the guy who fouls up everything," complained the new sentry.

Seaman Kowalski had just gone aboard the ship when the Captain stepped out on deck to look over his ship. The Quarterdeck awning shielded the Captain from the view of those on the Quarterdeck, but he could clearly hear the conversation.

"Roast beef today, Ski."

tomorrow, or sometime after we've all been transferred elsewhere and this ship is being fought by people we don't know.

Whether you're cleaning boilers, standing bridge watch or administering your training program, it's easy to say 'the Exec wants' or 'Mr. Jones says.' It's the easy, lazy way; not the right way. You can sometimes discuss or even argue with an order, but when you give it to a subordinate, make him think it is coming from you.

Giving orders the lazy way is like a drug. Once you start saying 'the OPS Officer wants' you will find yourself doing it more and more until you can't get a thing done any other way. Your men will pass along orders that way, too, and it will become a part of your organization right down to the lowest level. When some problem arises and you want action, you'll get 'who wants this' or 'why should we.'

Each of you ask yourself if you have given an order today or yesterday in the lazy manner. I think almost all of us have. Now ask yourself if that order really originated with the person who gave it to you, or did they receive it from a higher level? We never really know, do we, but why should we even care?"

In almost every unit the "lazy" ordering starts on a particular level. From personal experience I can tell you that this can be an exact measure of the unit's effectiveness. If it starts at the department head level or higher it's a relatively bad outfit, and if it starts at the chief's level it's a relatively good outfit. You can find the level below which it starts by hearing a new title preceeding a primary billet. "Damn Exec" means that the Executive Officer is the lowest level giving orders properly. "Damn Division Officer" means that the division officers are taking the responsibility for the order.

Here I am using some of those words, responsibility and authority, those undefined terms we want to avoid, but perhaps we have helped define them.

To be more specific, every officer does some "lazy" ordering, but we need to do it less and less. We must try to push the "damn" title down as far as it will go.

Let's push the "damn officer" all the way to the chief and below, then we will have a Damn Good Ship.



E. W. CLEPTON, JR.

Copy to:
All Officers
All Chief Petty Officers

"Yeah, I know, and we wear peacoats from now on."

"Whaddaya mean, peacoats?"

"Yeah, peacoats on the pier, Damn Exec says no more foul weather jackets."

"Well that ain't all, we got to polish this here brightwork 'til it shines every morning before quarters, Damn Exec says that too."

"Damn Exec."

The Captain was shocked. "Why 'Damn Exec' from these seaman?" he thought. It was easy to trace what had happened to the order the Captain gave the Executive Officer that morning. It was easy to see that the Executive Officer had passed it along in proper military manner. It was easy to see that the junior officers, leading petty officers, and lower petty officers were passing it along saying "The Exec wants..." That's the way orders are passed along. Why? Because "it is easy."

"All ship's officers assemble in the wardroom," the Boatswain's Mate announced on the loud speaker system. The Exec escorted the Captain in. The junior officers took their seats when the Captain was seated. The Executive Officer remained standing. "Gentlemen, the Captain has a few words to say to us today."

The Captain rose and looked around slowly. "Gentlemen, we are continually exposed to words like administration, leadership, management, capabilities, organization, responsibilities, authority, discipline, and cooperation. You use these words every day. You give lectures to your men and use them, but if I were to ask each of you for a definition of any of these words I would get such a wide variety of answers that an expert couldn't tell what word we were defining. Some we probably couldn't define at all. We still use them, and will continue to use them as they are used in the continually mounting number of articles, instructions, and books we must read.

If I were to ask any of you how can we improve leadership I would get answers filled with these words - undefined and meaningless.

If we listed all of the nicely worded theories of leadership, studied them, memorized them, and took a test on them, we would all pass. But this would not improve our ability as leaders one bit. I can tell a story, containing none of these meaningless words that will improve your leadership.

In 1943, I was Secondary Battery Officer in a cruiser in the South Pacific. In my second battle, gun control was hit and I lost communications with everyone except my 5-inch mounts. I could see that the after main battery turret was badly damaged and two enemy destroyers were closing us from astern. At the time my 5-inch mounts were shooting at airplanes. I ordered my two after 5-inch mounts to use high capacity ammunition and shift targets to the two destroyers closing from astern. But sir, we're supposed to handle the air targets; who said to shift target?" my mount captain asked.

There were noise and smoke and explosions that day, but the explosion that I heard and felt was not from a shell, but from those words of the mount captain.

Those attacking destroyers got a few shots in at us before we beat them off. Maybe those shots found a target and some of my shipmates died. I never found out. There was too much other damage.

I thought over the battle afterward and realized that this entire situation was my fault, not the mount captain's. I may have been responsible for the death of some of my shipmates because up to that day I always gave orders to my subordinates by attaching the originator's name to it.

What does that mean? It means that it was the easy thing to do, to say, 'the Gunnery Officer wants us to shift targets.'

In this peacetime world you may say that we no longer have this struggle on a life or death basis. Quick response does not mean life or death now, but it might



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER (CVN 69)
FPO NEW YORK 09532

21 June 1982

COMMANDING OFFICER'S SPECIAL MEMORANDUM

Subj: Alcohol Abuse

1. General

a. Alcohol abuse is any irresponsible use of alcohol that adversely affects individual or unit performance, debilitates physical or mental health, interferes with financial responsibility, deteriorates personal relationships, leads to violation of military regulations or civil laws, or contributes to disorderly conduct.

b. The effects on individuals who abuse alcohol and on innocent victims of their irresponsible drinking are well documented. Incidents of violent crime, automobile accidents, spouse and child abuse, absenteeism, aggressive behavior and other irresponsible acts are characteristics of alcohol abuse which are of particular concern.

c. Alcohol abuse constitutes a threat to the quality of individual performance equal to that posed by the use of illegal drugs. It demands immediate, firm, and direct action by leaders at all levels.

2. Policy Implementation

a. Leadership Responsibilities.

(1) The objective of this policy is to prevent the irresponsible use of alcohol by members in IKE/CVW 7. This effort requires a total leadership commitment involving the full participation of all officers, chief petty officers and all petty officers. Leaders must understand that alcohol abuse is a constant threat to the well-being of all hands and their capability to perform effectively; they must be alert to any member with the characteristics of the irresponsible drinker. Once identified, the irresponsible drinker must be confronted and appropriate action taken. Command action should include disciplinary and/or adverse administrative action whenever alcohol abuse results in irresponsible performance or conduct. In all cases, emphasis up front should be placed on early identification of alcohol involvement, positive motivation and, when justified, rehabilitation with a goal of influencing changes before disciplinary or adverse administrative action is required.

(2) An essential part of the leadership effort is to change the attitude of all embarked towards the use of alcohol. All leaders have the responsibility for setting the example. They must convince all in their charge that IKE is committed to preventing alcohol abuse and will not condone sub-standard performance or conduct resulting from such abuse, regardless of grade or length of service of the abuser. Leaders must seek opportunities to develop in their subordinates the attitude that alcohol abuse is a form of indiscipline. They must encourage all members to evaluate the adverse impact of irresponsible drinking on themselves, their fellow shipmates, and their organization. In short, they must reinforce the policy that alcohol abuse is not tolerated and that irresponsible drinkers are to be held accountable for their actions.

(3) The fact that alcohol is legal, readily available, and almost universally used at social gatherings establishes the parameters within which the effort to combat alcohol abuse must take place. Under these circumstances, a prohibition of the use of alcohol ashore is not an option that we can realistically use to prevent alcohol abuse except, of course, for personnel on duty. Obviously, other measures and influences have to be applied if the desired goal of this alcohol abuse policy is to be achieved (i.e., to change the attitude of potential abusers toward the use of alcohol).

(4) Perhaps the most important single action that we can take is to ensure a total effort on the part of leadership to deglamorize the use of alcohol. The long-standing perception, particularly on the part of younger personnel, that hard drinking somehow constitutes part of the image of a hard working sailor must be dispelled. In this regard, anything that contributes to the all too prevalent perception that the use of alcohol is expected at social gatherings and certain recreational activities must be avoided. Department heads and squadron commanders should carefully screen promotional themes for parties ashore and recreational activities to ensure that alcohol and its availability, perhaps at reduced prices, are not overly emphasized. All practices that encourage our men to drink, e.g., DIV/DEPT/SQDN parties where beer is the only beverage available, should be discontinued.

(5) The subject of alcohol abuse, with emphasis on the various approaches for successfully combatting irresponsible drinking should be discussed on a regular basis within the chain of command and during training periods at the division level. While individual responsibility for the consequences of alcohol abuse should be stressed, an effort should also be made to create an intolerant attitude on the part of all hands toward alcohol-induced patterns of individual or group misconduct. Since peer pressure can be especially effective in discouraging irresponsible drinking, emphasis should be placed on the responsibility of individuals to exert a positive influence on fellow shipmates. This type of involvement should be encouraged and fostered at every opportunity.

(6) Department heads and commanding officers of squadrons will ensure individual attention, reporting, and follow-up action in every instance of alcohol abuse that impacts adversely on the individual or the command. In this regard, it is essential that those members who are not separated from the Navy as a result of irresponsible behavior resulting from alcohol abuse be allowed to prove themselves. Consequently, no action should be taken that is degrading or that otherwise would influence the individual to act in a manner other than as a proud man who made a mistake and wants to overcome it. Educational and/or rehabilitation programs should be continued, as appropriate and necessary, to assist motivated members to return to full duty.

(7) Our responsibility to combat alcohol abuse is not limited to the confines of the ship or squadrons. Cooperative military and civilian safety programs, designed to discourage alcohol abuse and driving under the influence of alcohol will continue to be supported with local authorities in surrounding communities. Aggressively enforced, such programs can serve as a significant deterrent to irresponsible drinking by our men while on liberty.

(8) The key elements of the leadership effort are prevention, timely identification, precise documentation, effective treatment, and appropriate discipline, followed by restoration to full duty or separation as appropriate. Any reluctance on the part of anyone in a position of authority to confront an abuser, regardless of grade or length of

service would be particularly detrimental and would constitute a serious disservice to the individual, his family, and his fellow shipmates.

(9) As in the case of the use of illegal drugs, the abuse of alcohol is often related to boredom, combined with a lack of knowledge on the part of the individual or lack of aggressive promotion on our part of vigorous programs specifically designed to involve our men in healthy and productive off-duty activities. Attention should be placed on gaining maximum participation in intramural sports programs and other competitive activities conducted outside of normal duty hours in the evenings and on weekends. Special programs to interest our men in using existing recreational facilities should be reemphasized. This effort, often neglected in the past, can be accomplished in a variety of ways and is limited only by our own imagination and dedication. The satisfaction of these needs should be vigorously pursued in an effort to have available on board and on base productive, interesting or entertaining activities in which alcohol is not normally included.

(10) Constructive activities, to include chapel programs, should be strongly encouraged and supported as part of this overall effort.

b. Enforcement of Standards

(1) Alcohol-induced patterns of substandard performance, misconduct, or incapacity to perform an assigned mission will not be condoned, regardless of the grade or length of service of the member involved.

(2) Alcohol-related acts of misconduct or substandard performance by members will result in prompt and appropriate disciplinary or administrative action.

(3) Alcohol-dependent members and those who choose to drink irresponsibly will be required to participate in an organized education or treatment program (CAAC and/or NASAP). After successfully completing the program, they will either be returned to full duty or separated from service in accordance with article 3420184 or other provisions of the NAVMILPERS Manual appropriate to their overall performance and conduct. IKE Instruction 5355.1 effectively addresses the treatment and rehabilitation program for those who have developed a dependency on alcohol.

(4) Formal treatment and local rehabilitation have returned many Navy men to full duty who subsequently serve with full effectiveness. Accordingly, promotion and assignment opportunities will not be denied any man solely on the basis of prior alcohol abuse that led to formal treatment, provided that the individual has demonstrated full restoration to productive service.

(5) Those who refuse to cooperate in a treatment program will be separated in accordance with article 3420184 of the NAVMILPERS Manual. Those who return to alcohol abuse after rehabilitation will be evaluated for additional treatment or separated as appropriate in each case.

(6) Those who complete formal alcohol treatment and whose alcohol abuse prior to treatment resulted in performance or behavior problems will be considered ineligible for reenlistment/augmentation for one year following formal treatment. A one-year extension of enlistment may be granted to provide the time necessary to ensure their conduct and performance are consistent with IKE standards. Any extension of enlistment beyond the one-year period following treatment may be granted to enlisted personnel in accordance with article 1050150 of the NAVMILPERS Manual. Subject to the one-year restriction established above, the authorized reenlistment will, in all cases, be based solely on the member's conduct and performance of duty.

(7) Department heads and squadron commanding officers will formally counsel their men identified as alcohol abusers on the adverse consequences of the continued irresponsible use of alcohol. When justified by the nature and circumstances surrounding the first alcohol-induced incident, a page 13 entry or special in-house fitness report may be made. For those who continue to abuse alcohol subsequent to the initial formal counseling session, special enlisted evaluations or officer fitness reports will be drafted for my signature.

3. Coordinating Instructions

a. The policies established herein are effective immediately. They will not be applied retroactively.

b. A concerted effort will be made to ensure that all embarked are fully informed on all aspects of this memorandum and on their responsibility to comply with the standards established herein. There should be no question in anyone's mind that those who do not meet these standards will be recommended for separation from the Navy.

c. The privilege of being an officer or enlisted member of the Navy includes the responsibility for maintaining the highest standards of discipline, conduct and performance. Alcohol abuse is a form of indiscipline that can seriously reduce the overall value and effectiveness of the individual, and degrade the operational effectiveness of this organization. Those who choose to abuse alcohol will be identified and assisted to the degree possible, but in all cases held accountable for their actions.



E. W. CLEPTON, JR.

Copy to:
All Officers
All Chief Petty Officers



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER (CVN 69)
FPO NEW YORK 09532

21 February 1984

COMMANDING OFFICER'S MEMORANDUM #20

Subj: Trust and Confidence

We are often faced with a dilemma in the conduct of our technically complex business and in the direction of the fine people under us. This dilemma has to do with the necessity for us as leaders to be able to display the trust and confidence in those under our charge and, at the same time, be able to exercise our responsibilities for their training and the safe operation of all our equipment. We certainly don't want anyone to be injured and we don't want to damage any of our extremely expensive equipment. Either type mishap can seriously impair our capability to maintain maximum readiness. It may take a new leader awhile to get to know his men and equipment well enough to where he is comfortable with their capabilities and qualifications to meet all the tasks assigned. That is normal. Depending on the new leader's previous experience, and the number of men involved, and the complexity of the equipment, it can take less than a week or over a month. All during this learning process, however, the new leader remains responsible for the safe conduct of operations, supervision of the training and qualifications of his men, and the quality control of all evolutions assigned his division.

To have trust and confidence in those that work for you has enormous impact on the overall efficiency and morale of your division and in their ability to carry out all missions assigned to them, irregardless of the hours involved or adverse conditions and pressures applied. They always want to do their best if they feel their leadership is willing to knock down an obstacle or two in their behalf. They will do their jobs the way you want them to, the right way, as long as you train them properly and then continue to insist on quality compliance. It is our responsibility to equip them with the ability to do the task correctly through adherence to progressive education (PQS) and hands on training under qualified supervision. Once they have the requisite qualifications, we must be confident in our training to be able to be confident in their ability to employ it.

The rub comes when our men have done the training, finished the qualification programs, became qualified, and are routinely doing a super job of carrying out their responsibilities. We as leaders have an additional and crucial responsibility, and that is to be continually quality controlling our own output. Ofttimes this can be confusing to the men because on the one hand, you are telling them over and over how good they are (as they are), while on the other hand, you must be fulfilling your responsibility to ensure their work is correct, safe, and complete. They say "You keep telling us how good we are at what we do, but you keep checking up on us...looking over our shoulders...I don't understand?!" The confusion that can result in the minds of your men can work against you if the subject is not addressed in open discussion so each understands his own role and his own responsibilities.

The whole issue boils down to acceptance of the potential for human error that always exists whenever men or men and machines are working together to accomplish a mission. This is true in all walks of life, but becomes so very true in the environment in which we operate in IKE. It is true on the flight deck, in the reactor plants, in the galley, in maintenance shops, on the bridge, in storerooms, in the magazines, in the dentist's chair, on an UNREP station, on operating consoles, and in virtually every watch station, operating station or maintenance activity throughout the ship. As good as we may be or become through our experiences and our training, each one of us is capable of making a bad decision, or making the wrong assumption, or hitting the wrong button, or turning the wrong valve, or making just the wrong mistake at precisely the wrong time, and thereby

be the cause of some sort of a mishap. Our own "little" mistake may not seem significant in itself, but it could very well be just the last in a series of "little" problems that set up what is about to happen. It is also more likely that any one thing that one man does wrong won't cause anything bad to happen (right then), but that mistake when coupled with one or many to follow will be part of the chain of events that eventually leads up to an incident of some sort - some incident that causes a degradation in the ship's ability to perform the mission or just a lot of follow up action required to dig out from a series of mistakes made over a long period of time. I am not talking of neglect or malicious damage - I am talking about good men, doing the best they know how, pulling their share of the load, getting the job done, with pride in their work and their division, all for the common good. I am simply talking about simple human error, not intentional at all, but the potential exists in every one of us in everything we do - every day. We must accept that as reality - and then we must be able to address ways to guard against it causing us serious problems.

But where do we draw the line? We live and work in a world of **ZERO TOLERANCE**. We can never accept the premise that maybe a bomb will go off in a magazine someday, or that it is inevitable that someday we'll have a radiological incident through some mistake made by a nuclear watchstander, or that flying is inherently dangerous so we are bound to lose a flight crew or a member of the flight deck crew sometime, or that someday a line is bound to part on an UNREP station, or the myriad other scenarios you can easily conjure up in your mind. Where do we draw the line? Do we just apply quality control principles if loss of life is possible? NO. None of us are capable of making such judgements. Is the PMS for cleaning filters on a dryer any less important than ensuring that the valves work in our reactor space ventilation/isolation systems? As I write this I have on my desk a bearing that catastrophically failed because simple lubrication PMS was not done over a period of time. The equipment is used very infrequently, but when it was needed, the whole assembly failed and a heavy piece of equipment fell damaging a piece of yellow gear. If a man had been there, as he was moments before, he would have been killed. All of these lessons have been learned the hard way on other ships and with other peoples' blood. Ours is not to learn them again; it is to learn from them and to do our jobs the way we are taught to do them; it is to teach the right way; the right way must be the **SAFE** way and vice versa; and it is to continually be checking our training for adequacy, our people for their qualifications standards, and ourselves for the fulfillment of our responsibilities to quality control.

Does this quality control business mean to you, or to your men, that you don't have appropriate and respectful trust and confidence in their abilities to do their work correct, safe and complete? NO. You can have, and should have, the utmost trust and confidence in your men as long as you have seen to their training and they have responded in kind to that training and continue to strive for professionalism in their work. Trust and confidence throughout a professional working organization is beautiful, and it is most satisfying for both you and them, and it means everything to your department and the ship. Strive for it and continue to tell and show them your respect for their abilities. But never abrogate your responsibilities to be checking on their training and their watchstanding and their ability to operate or do maintenance "by the book" and "to the letter". If there are mistakes to be corrected in the system, or in the training, or in the MRC card, or whatever/wherever, we will correct those mistakes or submit the feedback reports or whatever it takes. But never let your good feeling about your men and the trust and confidence you have in their abilities cloud your responsibility to be always quality controlling your product - the output of your men - and the operability of your equipment.


E. W. CLEXTON, JR.

Distribution:
ALL OFFICERS
ALL CHIEF PETTY OFFICERS



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
USS DWIGHT D. BENHOWER (CYN 69)
FPO NEW YORK 09532

3 July 1984

COMMANDING OFFICER'S MEMORANDUM #21

Subj: COHESION

For almost ten years now I have stated in many forums that the real inner strength of the IKE/CVW7 team is the cohesion of all for the common good - mission capability. It is simple enough to say that for mission accomplishment all orders come from the top, the Captain, and all beneath him just carry out those orders and it all works out just great. **It ain't that simple.** The vertical chain of command is but the skeleton for the real muscle and meat that forms the real body of the living IKE/Air Wing Team. Orders flow up and down the vertical chain of command with great regularity, and even alacrity at times, but there are also many ways that communication within the vertical chain of command can break down. It is during those times that parallel communication paths prevent a loss of communication and the word continues to flow.

I've said the subject was cohesion but have only talked about communications. That is just the point...the flow of communications up and down, around, between, in all directions is what keeps people aware, keeps them knowing and caring, able to do their jobs and helping others to do theirs. It is the lateral flow of communications that is the real muscle that holds the whole together. There is no way that the vertical chain of command can give all the right orders, make all the right decisions, have all the right answers, make it all happen. It is the communications between department heads, between division officers, between squadron commanders, chief petty officers, work-center supervisors, and many others -- all over the ship, ship and squadron -- all intermingled -- that is the real strength of how the IKE/Air Wing Team really accomplishes its mission.

This multiplicitious communications flow is not automatic. It is something that must be constantly nurtured by the Captain, by the Exec, by the CAG, by the Command Master Chiefs and by all that have seen and have benefitted from the system. When an officer or chief petty officer first checks into IKE or into a squadron, he is hopefully told the system exists and that it is intended to be available to him so he can accomplish his part of the whole to maximum efficiency, but he is not an automatic beneficiary of the system. He may be almost forced to participate before it becomes evident to him how he personally and professionally can be more effective within it than isolated without it. It is clearly the example given by department heads, squadron commanders, other officers and chief petty officers that is the proof of the system's existence.

For the first ten years of IKE's history this sense of cohesion and camaraderie among department heads for the good of all has been the single most powerful force working for the ultimate goal...mission accomplishment. When department heads meet to solve difficult problems facing the ship, they all have their own parochial reasons they would like to see the plan laid out a certain way, but they know two things for sure: one, they will solve the problem no matter how difficult it may seem; two, there will undoubtedly be some compromises -- by many of them. **And perhaps most important for the health of the system and its very survival is nobody keeps score!** Each problem is solved with the individual departmental inputs considered but the ultimate solution is that which is best overall for the ship and air wing. The Exec is commonly the only one in such a planning meeting who has that true overall perspective, but when the system is thriving most department heads share his view. When the parochial views seem to be getting too much attention and the common good doesn't seem to be dominant, the system needs some righting by the Exec, or by the CAG, or maybe even by the Captain.

You may remember this verse out of a poem written years ago by a Royal Navy Officer that seems just as useful today as it was fifty years ago:

"So ye, being Heads of Departments,
Do your growl with a smile on your lips,
Lest ye strive and in anger be parted,
And lessen the might of your ship."

Remember, cohesion is communications between ship's company and air wing, it's education of engineering and deck matters for aviators and aviation matters for surface warfare oriented officers and chiefs -- it's knowing what chief in the CPO Mess can help you solve a problem you are currently experiencing -- it's saying "yes" to whoever may seek your help someday, busy as you may be -- it's realizing that everyone else plays an important role in the whole -- and that all of us are forever competing for time, space, and people to do our jobs more efficiently.

It's a marvelous thing to see this cohesive effort all over the ship made up of thousands of individual contributions every day. Don't ever lose it -- realize it takes that ounce of extra effort, usually for someone else. You may not be the immediate beneficiary of your efforts in this regard, but you will be the ultimate beneficiary of the effort as the ship and air wing together accomplish any mission tasked - in any scenario - through strength - through communications - through COHESION.


E. W. CLEXTUN, JR.

Distribution:

ALL OFFICERS

ALL CHIEF PETTY OFFICERS

To all the officers and Chief Petty Officers
of IKE and Air Wing 7, I solicit your same
unfailing support of Captain Macke, that you
have so unselfishly given me and each
other. The strength of IKE is her crew and
they will always need and thrive under
your cohesive leadership efforts. You have
my deepest respect and admiration.

ADMINISTERING DISCIPLINE IN A CONSTRUCTIVE MANNER

Naval organizations, whether divisions, ships or fleets, are no more perfect than other organizations. The causes of imperfection can be institutional, administrative, related to equipment maintenance or design, or simply because of the human factor. Sometimes things just don't work out the way they were supposed to because of a combination of factors and people involved. But when things go wrong because a member of the unit clearly didn't do his/her part or didn't do it the way he/she knew it was to be done, some form of discipline is entirely in order. Discipline, however, need not be a "stopper". It needn't be a negative experience for the unit or even for the individual. In fact, if the individual at fault is to be a better motivated member of the organization out of the experience, discipline had best be positive, ergo motivational. That seems to be dichotomous; to be "called down", yet be more motivated by the discipline applied. It all depends on the manner of application.

On the surface two different leaders can attain the same results from their respective units, yet the styles of leaderships may be totally different. One unit may strive to achieve because of the positive personal leadership style of the boss, while another unit may get the same apparent results but mostly because they were driven to it by a duress style of leadership.

There have been some naval leaders who practiced duress leadership where all was accomplished out of fear of reprisal if something went wrong. Was it effective? Very. Was it useful in meeting an end that was crucial to our national defense? Very. Was it motivational? No! Did people clamor to be in an organization with a duress leadership style? No. There are examples that illustrate how great things can be accomplished under negative styles of leadership as well as under more positive styles depending on the human element price we are willing to pay.

It is generally agreed that the human element price we pay in a duress system is not worth it over time. The eventual payoff in everything we do in our operating units is combat effectiveness. There are many ingredients to that accomplishment and the administration of discipline is one. Applied discipline will have great impact on the overall morale and combat effectiveness of a unit.

The crew will have their own beliefs as to whether the discipline in their unit is fair or unfair. These beliefs will be more dependent on perceptions of single cases more so than on some analytical study of all cases. The lesson to be learned is that consistency in judgments is the most important factor in administering discipline. Discipline that seem to waiver depending on the mood of the Captain, or length of time at sea, or any other environmental or human factor variation is most disconcerting and can not be construed as fair. FAIR to the hard-nosed Chief may mean maximum punishment for almost any infraction, while FAIR to an immature and errant sailor may mean the lightest sentence possible. FAIR to the Captain and the supporting chain of command must mean humane and consistent justice.

The accused must always have the opportunity (not just the right) to have his say - to speak his case - to give his side of the story - to explain why he did what he did, or to claim he didn't do what he is accused of doing. Sometimes they are inappropriately advised not to say anything for any number of reasons, so it is often left to the administrator of discipline to get the accused to speak his/her mind. This takes time. It may not seem long to the accused, because it (hopefully) is his only case, but it can consume many hours by unit seniors because the boss reviews all the cases. Nevertheless, giving the accused ample opportunity to state his views on the case is crucial to the realities and the perceptions of a fair hearing.

Timeliness is second only to fairness in administering discipline. An individual who knows he/she has violated the UCMJ or unit regulations deep-down wants to be dealt with to "clear the air". In units where discipline is held up because of "more pressing matters", there often exists a general pall over many members, because of the uncertainty of what is going to happen to them when discipline is finally meted. This creates an environment that is not conducive to teamwork and aggressive mission accomplishment. Those awaiting punishment are not sure if they are really part of the team or soon to be branded as outcasts. Some can get a defeatist attitude, commit other punishable acts, and cause an overall drop in the capability and morale of their work center or division because of the increased nonproductive work they are causing. Each infraction should be dealt with up to the appropriate level of the chain of command within two weeks. Some violations require more investigation than others, but, in general, an infraction that is going to be dealt with at the Division level should be concluded in 3-5 days; at the Department Head level in 6-8 days and; by the Exec in 9-11 days.

If factors such as unfairness or untimeliness or improper (railroading) leadership's are at play, the accused can often rightfully feel bitterness out of the experience. He will lose whatever respect he may have had for the organization and/or his chain of command and although justice may have been (ill) served, future contributions to his units mission accomplishment may be nil, except under duress. That scenario is very unhealthy, not only for the individual, but also for his division and the unit as a whole.

If the chain of command practices fairness (consistency), timeliness and positive, caring, helpful leadership, the individual will feel well served, relieved, almost glad to serve punishment, most likely resolved not to repeat, and most importantly motivated to "rejoin" his peers and bosses in accomplishing the mission at task.

Discipline administration is often more difficult at one or two levels of the chain of command than at others. It is important to recognize this and understand some of the reasons. Peer pressure, although not called discipline, is the most powerful force at work on young men/women in their first few years in the service. The leader that recognizes this and has the faith and belief in the basic American ethic can, through standard positive and motivating leadership, take advantage of peer pressure to help keep his/her division in a

well trained and disciplined state. Middle grade petty officers are not commonly the best disciplinarians. Often they are more effective because they are peers, as previously discussed, than because they are superiors. It takes several years of experience as a middle grade petty officer to acquire leadership skills needed to be a good disciplinarian in the work center or division. There is wide variance between middle grade petty officer leadership styles from too buddy-buddy'ish (ineffective) to too authoritarian (overkill). The ones that show a firm, positive approach to leadership at an early stage are destined to go considerably higher and should be recognized as such. Division Officers often have difficulty with direct personal discipline of subordinates because of a combination of inexperience, and proximity in age group to most of the division, or age inversion (disciplining one older). For these reasons the Division Chief Petty Officer can be invaluable in assisting, teaching, and administering the discipline process. He must embody the same ideals of fairness, consistency, and timeliness to be effectively useful. Since both the LCPO and the Division Officer are in the chain of command, however, heavy reliance on the LCPO can only last 2-3 months, while the Division Officer is gaining experience.

Discipline administered above the Division Officer level is usually more structured because of the experience of the individuals, the extent of their other duties, and the likelihood the offense is more serious. Division Officers should contribute significantly to the administration of discipline above them in the chain of command. If the individual has committed a serious infraction of the UCMJ but there are extenuating circumstances, he should be encouraged and advised to state what actually happened. Some may be afraid to speak out when in front of the Exec or the Captain. The reviewing Officer should ask the Division Officers opinion of the individual. Do not be shy or assume anything. Speak in the absolute. If the individual is a good contributor to division work and a positive influence, say so. If the individual is not, do not be caught in the trap that "a good Division Officer stands up for his men" when you and the rest of the division know the individual is a detractor from mission accomplishment or a negative influence. Say so. Stand up for the good ones (most of your division), but require the others to earn your respect through their performance and attitude.